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REFLECTIONS ON THE CHURCH/STATE PUZZLE
Kermit V. Lipez*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past five years, the Supreme Court has decided four
important cases involving the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment: Town of Greece v. Galloway,1 Trinity Lutheran
Church v. Comer,2 Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil
Rights Commission,3 and American Legion v. American
Humanist Association.4 By analyzing and reacting to these
cases, I hope to offer a perspective on pieces of the church/state
puzzle that will help judges and others think more critically
about future developments in this consequential area of the law.5
Masterpiece Cakeshop and Trinity Lutheran are primarily
Free Exercise Clause cases. Town of Greece and American
Legion are Establishment Clause cases. Taken together, these
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*Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. This essay is based on
a lecture I gave as a “jurist in residence” at the Gould Law School of the University of
Southern California on January 23, 2019. I wish to thank my talented clerks Lauren Greil
and Miriam Becker-Cohen, and my talented intern, Ainsley Tucker, for their invaluable
assistance in preparing this essay.
1. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014).
2. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 2012
(2017).
3. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct.
1719 (2018).
4. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass'n, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019).
5. In approximately the last five years, the Supreme Court has also decided two
important church/state cases under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000bb-1 et seq. [hereinafter “RFRA”], see Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573
U.S. 682 (2014), and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000cc et seq., see Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (2015). In a third case involving RFRA,
Zubik v. Burwell, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016), the Court avoided a ruling on the
merits and vacated and remanded so that the courts of appeals could address the arguments
made by the parties in response to the order for supplemental briefing. I do not discuss
these cases.
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6. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In Lemon, the Supreme Court held that Pennsylvania and
Rhode Island statutes that provided state funding for non-public, non-secular schools
violated the Establishment Clause because they created excessive entanglement of state and
church. In reaching that conclusion, the Court adopted the three-part Lemon test, which
requires that a statute or government practice (1) must have a “secular legislative purpose”;
(2) must have a principal or primary effect that “neither advances nor inhibits religion”;
and (3) must “not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.” Id. at 612–
13 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8. 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (Free Exercise Clause).
9. 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (Establishment Clause). Justice Thomas rejects the incorporation
of the Establishment Clause against the states, as he made clear in his concurrence in
American Legion. See infra p. 43.
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cases reflect a weakening of the Establishment Clause in favor
of a stronger free exercise right—a trend that will likely increase
the presence of majority religions in the public square, to the
possible detriment of minority religions. As I explain, this trend
is most notable in the continuing shift in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence away from the three-part test articulated in Lemon
v. Kurtzman,6 with its focus on the present effects of statutes or
government practices with religious implications, toward a
“historically rooted practice” test. Unlike the Lemon test, the
“historically rooted practice” test, as articulated in Town of
Greece and invoked in American Legion, fails to account for the
religious pluralism of today's society. I therefore counsel caution
in eliminating Lemon from our Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. I also warn against conflating a measured
separation of church and state in judicial decisions—still central
to the neutrality principle of the Religion Clauses—with
hostility to religion.
The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment are familiar:
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”7 These
Clauses frame the debate about the proper relationship between
the government and religion. Although the First Amendment
explicitly limits the power of the federal government—
“Congress shall make no law”—the Supreme Court ruled in a
pair of cases in the 1940s, Cantwell v. Connecticut 8 and Everson
v. Board of Education,9 that those limits also apply to state
governments through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Given the generality of the Religion Clauses, there is no
consensus on the breadth of their application. But the ongoing

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 9 Side A

12/10/2019 14:38:26

/,3(=5(6(1' '2127'(/(7( 



30

THE CHURCH/STATE PUZZLE

9

debate reflects two competing visions on the Supreme Court
about the proper relationship between the government and
religion under our Constitution: the “accommodation vision”
and the “separation vision.”10 Painting in broad strokes, the
accommodation vision requires government to make ample
room for religion in public life, or, to use a favorite phrase of the
accommodation advocates, in the public square. This vision
favors a narrow application of the Establishment Clause and an
expansive application of the Free Exercise Clause. The
separation vision requires government to keep a safe distance
from religion. It is wary of religion's presence in the public
square, favoring an expansive application of the Establishment
Clause and a narrow application of the Free Exercise Clause.
The separate opinions of the justices in Masterpiece Cakeshop,
Trinity Lutheran, Town of Greece, and American Legion reflect
these competing visions.
II. MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP: THE FIGHT FOR RELIGIOUS
EXCEPTIONS TO PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS LAWS

A. Precedent: Employment Division v. Smith
In a precedent central to Masterpiece Cakeshop,
Employment Division v. Smith,11 the Court had to decide if a

12/10/2019 14:38:26

10. Compare, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81
NW. U. L. REV. 146, 147 (1987) (describing the separationist vision), with, e.g., William J.
Cornelius, Church and State—The Mandate of the Establishment Clause: Wall of
Separation or Benign Neutrality? 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 13–14 (1984) (describing the
accommodationist vision); see also Carolyn A. Deverich, Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence and the Free Exercise Dilemma: A Structural Unitary-Accommodationist
Argument for the Constitutionality of God in the Public Square, 2006 B.Y.U. L. REV. 211,
262 (2006) (critiquing the separationist view and advocating for an accommodation
approach).
11. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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Some accommodationists seek to expand the Free Exercise
Clause by requiring religious exceptions to laws that prohibit
discrimination in places of public accommodation. In
Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Supreme Court considered the
demand of a baker for a religious exemption from a law
prohibiting discrimination against gay couples.
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state, consistent with the Free Exercise Clause, could deny
unemployment benefits to persons dismissed from their jobs for
violating state criminal laws by using peyote in their religious
worship.12 Prior to Smith, the Court had used the balancing test
of Sherbert v. Verner13 to evaluate the kind of free exercise
claim raised in Smith. Under that test, “governmental actions
that substantially burden a religious practice must be justified by
a compelling governmental interest.”14 To the surprise and
dismay of many scholars and advocates of the free exercise
rights of minorities,15 the Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia,
abandoned the Sherbert balancing test in favor of a sweeping
rule to justify the denial of unemployment benefits:
[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of
the obligation to comply with a “valid and neutral law of
general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes
(or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or
proscribes).”16

Justice Scalia insisted that this rule was not new.17 The only
precedent to the contrary, he said, involved “not the Free

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 9 Side B
12/10/2019 14:38:26

12. Id. at 890.
13. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that a state may not apply the eligibility provisions for
unemployment compensation in a way that requires workers of some faiths to abandon
their religious convictions).
14. Smith, 494 U.S. at 883 (citing Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402–03).
15. See The Smith Decision: The Court Returns to the Belief-Action Distinction, PEW
RESEARCH CTR.: RELIGION & PUB. LIFE (Oct. 24, 2007), https://www.pewforum.org/
2007/10/24/a-delicate-balance/ (describing “significant political protest from religious
organizations and civil liberties groups”); Michael McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism,
57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1990) (referring to “over a hundred constitutional law
scholars” who joined with religious and civil liberties groups in filing a petition for
rehearing); cf. Smith, 494 U.S. at 919 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (lamenting the impact that
Smith would have on minority religious groups and cautioning that courts should not “turn
a blind eye to the severe impact of a State’s restrictions on the adherents of a minority
religion” (citation omitted)).
16. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879.
17. Despite Justice Scalia’s insistence that the Smith test was not new law, the Court
had routinely applied Sherbert’s strict scrutiny to laws that inhibited the free exercise of
religion prior to Smith. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemp’t Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136
(1987) (striking down denial of unemployment benefits to Seventh-day Adventist fired for
refusing to work on Saturday, the sect’s Sabbath); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252
(1982) (finding that compelling government interest in maintaining national tax system
outweighed claim that payment of social security taxes offends religious belief); Thomas v.
Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (striking down denial of unemployment benefits for
Jehovah’s Witness whose religious beliefs prevented him from manufacturing weapons for
war); see also McConnell, supra note 15, at 1111 (characterizing the “theoretical
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Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in
conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as
freedom of speech and of the press.”18 Smith was not such a
hybrid case. He also said that a ruling in Smith’s favor under the
Sherbert test “would open the prospect of constitutionally
required religious exceptions from civic obligations of almost
every conceivable kind,”19 and would require judges to “weigh
the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all
religious beliefs,”20 an exercise better left to the legislature in a
democratic society. In a concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor,
who would have ruled for Oregon on the basis of the Sherbert
balancing test, lamented its abandonment: “The compelling
interest test [of Sherbert] reflects the First Amendment’s
mandate of preserving religious liberty to the fullest extent
possible in a pluralistic society.”21
Justice O’Connor’s critique became a rallying cry for
critics of the Smith decision, who saw its non-accommodation
approach to claims for religious exemptions from general laws
as a threat to religious freedom and diversity.22 In 1993, by
overwhelming majorities in both Houses, Congress passed the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act to restore the applicability of
the Sherbert balancing test to all federal and state laws.23 In a
1997 decision, City of Boerne v. Flores,24 the Supreme Court
limited the applicability of the Act to federal law, concluding
that Congress did not have the power pursuant to the
enforcement provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply
41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 10 Side A
12/10/2019 14:38:26

argument” in Smith as “contrary to the deep logic of the First Amendment”); but see Lyng
v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (declining to require federal
government to provide a compelling justification for road construction and timber
harvesting in a Native American religious site because the actions were neither coercive
nor a direct prohibition of religious practice).
18. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 (citations omitted).
19. Id. at 888.
20. Id. at 890.
21. Id. at 903 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
22. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 15, at 1136 (“In a world in which some beliefs are
more prominent than others, the political branches will inevitably be selectively sensitive
toward religious injuries. Laws that impinge upon the religious practices of larger or more
prominent faiths will be noticed and remedied. When the laws impinge upon the practice of
smaller groups, legislators will not even notice, and may not care even if they do notice.”).
23. See supra note 5.
24. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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that law to the states.25 As a result, critics of the Smith decision
have been hoping for years to find a case that would prompt the
Supreme Court to overturn Smith and return to the Sherbert
balancing test for free exercise challenges to state laws of
general applicability, such as anti-discrimination laws.
B. Masterpiece Cakeshop’s Sidestep

12/10/2019 14:38:26

25. See id. at 536 (finding that Congress exceeded its power under the Constitution and
that RFRA, as applied to the states, violated principles “necessary to maintain separation of
powers and the federal balance”). Since the Court’s announcement of RFRA’s
inapplicability to the states, twenty-one states have passed their own Religious Freedom
Restoration Acts, known as state RFRAs. See generally, e.g., State Religious Freedom
Restoration Acts, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (May 4, 2017), http://www.ncsl
.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx (showing state RFRAs as of
2015).
26. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723.
27. Id. at 1725 (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24–34–601(2)(a) (2017)).
28. Id. at 1726.

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 10 Side B

Masterpiece Cakeshop had the potential to be that case. In
2012, a same-sex couple visited the Masterpiece Cakeshop, a
bakery in Colorado, to order a wedding cake.26 The bakery’s
owner, Jack Phillips, told the couple that he would not create
such a cake because of his religious opposition to same-sex
marriage. They filed a complaint with the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission claiming a violation of Colorado’s antidiscrimination law, which prohibited a place of public
accommodation from refusing to provide goods or services on
the basis of certain protected characteristics, including sexual
orientation.27 The parties agreed that the bakery was a place of
public accommodation, and that Phillips’s refusal to sell the
couple a wedding cake violated Colorado’s anti-discrimination
law.28
Phillips argued that applying the anti-discrimination law to
his refusal violated his First Amendment rights to the free
exercise of religion and freedom of speech because requiring
him either to bake the cake or face civil fines impermissibly
forced him both to participate in an event (a same-sex wedding)
prohibited by his religion and express a viewpoint that he
abhorred. The Colorado Civil Rights Commission rejected those

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 11 Side A
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29. See Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 283 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015),
cert. denied sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, No.
14CA1351, 2016 WL 1645027 (Colo. Apr. 26, 2016).
30. See Map of States with Non-Discrimination Laws, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT
PROJECT (Sept. 18, 2019), http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/non_discrimination_
laws. Guam and Puerto Rico also have such laws. See id.
31. 390 U.S. 400 (1968). The law at issue was the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See id. at
400.
32. Id. at 402 n.5.
33. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724 (pointing out that “whatever the outcome
of some future controversy involving facts similar to these, the Commission’s actions here
violated the Free Exercise Clause; and its order must be set aside”).
34. Id. at 1729.

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 11 Side A

claims, and so did the Colorado courts.29 The United States
Supreme Court then agreed to hear the case.
This case was appropriately portrayed as a big deal.
Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia have laws
prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations on the
basis of sexual orientation,30 and the Supreme Court had never
recognized a religious exception to anti-discrimination laws.
Indeed, in the 1968 case of Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises,
Inc.,31 the owner of a South Carolina barbecue chain claimed
that a federal public accommodations law requiring him to serve
blacks infringed on his freedom of religion because of his
religious objections to integration. The Supreme Court rejected
that claim as “patently frivolous.”32 And then there was Justice
Scalia’s pronouncement in Smith that the Free Exercise Clause
does not permit an individual to disobey a law of general
applicability, like Colorado’s anti-discrimination law, on
religious grounds. If the Supreme Court recognized the religious
exception claim of the Masterpiece baker, it would have to
overrule Smith or somehow find it inapplicable. Going forward,
any such decision would have enormous implications for the
enforcement of anti-discrimination laws throughout the country.
To the relief of many, the Supreme Court avoided these
momentous issues. Justice Kennedy, writing for the sevenmember majority, ruled in favor of the baker because he found
that Colorado’s anti-discrimination law had not been neutrally
applied to baker Phillips.33 Some statements made by the
Colorado Civil Rights Commission showed “clear and
impermissible hostility toward the sincere religious beliefs that
motivated [the baker’s] objection.”34 Justice Kennedy also saw

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 11 Side B
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hostility in the Commission’s “difference in treatment” of the
Masterpiece baker’s case from the cases of three other bakers
who refused on the basis of conscience to bake cakes with
images conveying disapproval of same-sex marriage.35 The
Commission found that those bakers had not violated the public
accommodations law. In Justice Kennedy’s view, that
differential treatment justified Phillips’s concern that “the
State’s practice was to disfavor the religious basis of his
objection.”36
Although the Court declined to decide whether a business
operator like Phillips is exempted from public accommodations
laws because of his religious beliefs, several of the Justices
hinted at their views. In the first line of a concurrence, Justice
Gorsuch, joined by Justice Alito, cited Smith for its holding that
“a neutral and generally applicable law will usually survive a
constitutional free exercise challenge.”37 He then pointedly
observed that “Smith remains controversial in many quarters.”38
Still, he agreed with Justice Kennedy that the Colorado
Commission had violated Smith’s neutrality principle because it

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 11 Side B
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35. Id. at 1730.
36. Id. at 1731. In the cases of concern to Justice Kennedy, there were three complaints
from an individual who had approached bakers asking them to bake wedding cakes with
explicit messages, based on the Bible, condemning same-sex marriage. See id. at 1730–31.
The bakers refused to bake those cakes. Id. When the individual seeking those cakes filed
complaints with the Commission, it concluded that the bakers acted lawfully in refusing
service because they were legitimately concerned that the messages on the cakes, which
they deemed to be hateful, would be attributed to them, and because “each bakery was
willing to sell other products, including those depicting Christian themes, to the
prospective customers.” Id. at 1730. As Justice Kennedy saw it, when Phillips made his
compelled speech argument—that an implicit pro-gay marriage message on the wedding
cake would be attributed to him—or when he insisted that he would sell any of his other
products to gay or lesbian customers, the Commission ignored those arguments or
dismissed them as irrelevant. Id. Hence, in Justice Kennedy’s view, the Commission
showed hostility to the religious basis of Phillips’s objection.
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg noted a crucial difference between Phillips’s refusal to
bake a wedding cake for the same-sex couple and the refusal of the other bakers to bake
wedding cakes with messages condemning same-sex marriage: “Phillips declined to make
a cake he found offensive where the offensiveness of the product was determined solely by
the identity of the customer requesting it,” a clear violation of Colorado’s public
accommodations law. “The three other bakers declined to make cakes where their objection
to the product was due to the demeaning message the requested product would literally
display.” Id. at 1750–51 (Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting).
37. Id. at 1734 (Gorsuch & Alito, JJ., concurring).
38. Id.
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found the religious beliefs of the Masterpiece baker
“offensive.”39
In another concurring opinion, Justice Thomas, joined by
Justice Gorsuch, agreed with Justice Kennedy’s “hostility to . . .
religion” rationale but also expressed approval of the baker’s
free speech claim.40 Justice Thomas saw the baker as an artist
who expressed himself through his cakes. The decision of the
Colorado Commission thus compelled the baker to convey a
message that he rejected. Justice Thomas apparently viewed the
baker’s claim as the kind of hybrid described by Justice Scalia in
Smith—a claim that implicates the “Free Exercise Clause in
conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as
freedom of speech and of the press”—to which Smith’s rule does
not apply.41
Taken together, the Gorsuch and Thomas concurrences
indicate unmistakable hostility to Smith. One way or another, by
overturning Smith or writing around it, Justices Gorsuch and
Thomas seem determined to create a religious-belief exception
to public accommodations laws when they next have an
opportunity to do so, if they can persuade their colleagues.42
Recently, however, the Court passed on an opportunity to
do just that.43 Two bakers from Oregon, the Kleins, filed a
petition for certiorari challenging a finding that they violated
Oregon’s anti-discrimination law by refusing to bake a wedding
41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 12 Side A
12/10/2019 14:38:26

39. Id.
40. Id. at 1740 (Thomas & Gorsuch, JJ., concurring) (asserting that the Colorado
court’s “reasoning flouts bedrock principles of our free-speech jurisprudence and would
justify virtually any law that compels individuals to speak,” and that “[i]t should not pass
without comment”).
41. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
42. There is further evidence that four justices are determined to undo Smith. Justice
Alito recently filed a statement concurring in the denial of a certiorari petition with free
exercise implications because unresolved factual questions in the case made it “difficult if
not impossible” to decide the issues raised in the petition. Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist.,
___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 634, 635 (2019) (denying certiorari) (Alito, Thomas, Gorsuch &
Kavanaugh, JJ., concurring) (concerning whether a public-school athletic coach has a First
Amendment right to pray in the presence of his students). At the end of his statement,
Justice Alito noted that “the Court drastically cut back on the protection provided by the
free exercise clause” in Smith. Id. at 637. He then added that the Court had not been asked
to “revisit” Smith in this particular case—an invitation for future such petitions. Id.
43. See, e.g., Valerie Brannon, Supreme Court Vacates Another Opinion Applying
Antidiscrimination Laws to Religious Objectors 1, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.—LEGAL
SIDEBAR 10311 (June 19, 2019), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/LSB10311.pdf.
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cake for a same-sex couple.44 The Kleins asked the Court to
overturn Smith and find that Oregon’s anti-discrimination law
violated their free exercise rights.45 Instead, the Court simply
granted the certiorari petition, vacated the decision of the
Oregon Court of Appeals, and remanded for reconsideration in
light of Masterpiece Cakeshop.46 The import of such a GVR
order is always uncertain. In Klein, it could just mean avoidance
of a difficult issue that the Court did not want to revisit so
soon.47 However, there was evidence in the record that one of
the Oregon commissioners participating in the administrative
decision had made public statements arguably hostile to the
legal position of the Kleins. Hence, the Masterpiece Cakeshop
concern with hostility to religion by the state agency enforcing
the public accommodations law might have been in play.48
C. The Portent of Masterpiece Cakeshop
I am dismayed by the prospect that the Supreme Court
might create a religious exception to anti-discrimination laws.49

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 12 Side B
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44. Klein v. Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 410 P.3d 1051 (Or. Ct. App. 2017), cert.
granted, judgment vacated, ___ U. S. ___, 2019 WL 2493912 (Mem).
45. See id. at 1059.
46. Klein v. Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus., ___ U.S. ___, No. 18-547, 2019 WL
2493912 (Mem), at *1 (U.S. June 17, 2019). “GVR” stands for certiorari granted, lower
court decision vacated, and case remanded. A GVR order indicates that the lower court
should reconsider the case in light of new legal doctrine or cases decided after the lower
court decision but before the Court grants a writ of certiorari. GVRs are sometimes
construed as “a subtle (or not so subtle) hint that the court below might wish to try again,
else the Supreme Court might be roused to actually reverse.” Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The
Supreme Court’s Controversial GVRs—and an Alternative, 107 MICH. L. REV. 711, 715
(2009).
47. See Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, The Supreme Court Is Showing an Instinct for SelfPreservation, at Least Until Next Year’s Election, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/20/opinion/supreme-court-abortion-census.html/.
48. The standard for inquiry articulated by the Oregon Court of Appeals in Klein
differed from the Court’s inquiry in Masterpiece Cakeshop, which presented a zerotolerance mentality. Even “subtle departures” from neutrality can poison the well under
Masterpiece Cakeshop, whereas Klein required the decisionmaker to have prejudged the
issue so extensively “as to be incapable of determining its merits on the basis of the
evidence and arguments presented.” Klein, 410 P.3d at 1078 (citation omitted).
49. The Court may soon have another opportunity to do so in Fulton v. City of
Philadelphia, in which a petition for certiorari has been filed asking the Court to address
whether Philadelphia violated the free exercise rights of a religious agency by excluding it
from the city’s foster care system because it refused to consider same-sex couples for
foster-care placements. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Fulton v. City of Phila., No.
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19-123 (Jul 22, 2019) (petitioning for writ of certiorari to the Third Circuit in Fulton v. City
of Phila., 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019)); see also Mark Rienzi, Symposium: The Calm
Before the Storm for Religious-Liberty Cases? SCOTUSBLOG (Jul. 26, 2019), https://www
.scotusblog.com/2019/07/symposium-the-calm-before-the-storm-for-religious-liberty-cases/
(noting that the Supreme Court could “revisit or narrow Smith” if it granted certiorari in
Fulton).
50. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1734 (Gorsuch & Alito, JJ., concurring);
id. at 1740 (Thomas & Gorsuch, JJ., concurring).

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 13 Side A

The warning shot about Smith from Justices Gorsuch and Alito
in Justice Gorsuch’s Masterpiece Cakeshop concurrence signals
an attempt to overrule Smith and return to the Sherbert balancing
test for state laws affecting religious practice.50 If that happened,
the justices would confront two issues in a case like Masterpiece
Cakeshop. In a place of public accommodation, is a law that
compels the owner to provide goods or services to same-sex
couples, despite the owner’s religious objections to same-sex
marriage, a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion? If
so, does a compelling government interest justify that burden? In
my view, the answer to the substantial burden question is no; the
answer to the compelling interest question is yes.
If, like the baker, you believed that same-sex marriage was
religiously offensive and any degree of participation in same-sex
marriage was wrong, what freedom would you have to express
or practice that belief? Obviously, you could express that belief
at home to anyone within earshot. You could stand in your town
square and loudly proclaim your hostility to same-sex marriage.
You could pray openly against same-sex marriage in a place of
worship or anywhere you pray, and exercise your belief by
attending a house of worship where such ceremonies are
prohibited. In short, in our free society, with its robust
protections for freedom of worship and freedom of speech, you
have many opportunities to express your objections to same-sex
marriage and practice your belief.
Nevertheless, if you decided to open a business offering
goods and services to the public, you would no longer be
praying or speaking in the privacy of your home or the sanctity
of a place of worship. Instead, you would be participating in a
marketplace, licensed and regulated by the government in many
ways to protect the health and safety of the public. When you
choose to go into business, you should know that your business
is governed by anti-discrimination laws, like Colorado’s public
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accommodations statute forbidding the denial of goods and
services to potential customers because of their sexual
orientation. Or, as the price of doing business, you should know
that the state, pursuant to its police power, might later oblige
you to make a sale that you would find religiously offensive.
Does this obligation substantially burden your religious
freedom, the first showing required by the Sherbert balancing
test, even if you are free to express your opposition to same-sex
marriage at home, in public, or in your place of worship, and
even if you chose to enter a business governed by antidiscrimination laws? Those who supported the baker in the
Masterpiece Cakeshop case answered that question with a
resounding “yes”—your free exercise of religion is substantially
burdened in exactly those circumstances. Indeed, Phillips’s
Supreme Court brief took the position that the First Amendment
promises him “and all likeminded believers’ freedom to live out
their religious identity in the public square.”51 Former Attorney
General Sessions similarly defended the free exercise of religion
in the public square:
Americans do not give up their freedom of religion by
participating in the marketplace, partaking of the public
square, or interacting with government; . . . free exercise of
religion includes the right to act or abstain from action in
52
accordance with one’s religious beliefs.
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51. Brief for Petitioners at *16, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 3913762 [hereinafter
Masterpiece Petitioner’s Brief].
52. See Sarah Posner, The Christian Legal Army Behind Masterpiece Cake Shop,
NATION (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/the-christian-legal-armybehind-masterpiece-cakeshop/.
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Clearly, when Phillips’s counsel and former Attorney
General Sessions refer to the “public square,” they refer to
something more than the literal public squares of this country,
i.e., those many places where individuals and government
interact, including schools, legislative halls, businesses,
government offices, and government programs. According to the
accommodation vision, the government abridges the free
exercise of religion to the extent that it excludes religion from
these places, or precludes religious exceptions to general laws
that affect religious practices or beliefs. Hence, according to this
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53. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
54. This is not a case like Sherbert, in which an individual was forced to choose
between forsaking her religious beliefs or being ineligible for a government benefit. See id.
(finding a substantial burden where law required petitioner “to choose between following
the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of
the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand”).
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expansive version of the accommodation vision, telling baker
Phillips that, as the price of doing business, he must bake a cake
for a same-sex wedding, contrary to his religious belief, is
tantamount to telling him that he cannot pray as he wishes in his
place of worship. And to avoid that denial of his religious
preference, the courts must accommodate Phillips’s free exercise
right by protecting him from the application of an antidiscrimination law.
This argument cannot survive the Sherbert balancing
analysis.53 Under that framework, the Masterpiece baker must
show that his religious exercise was substantially burdened by
the requirement that he create the wedding cake. Several factors
weigh against him. First, he was engaged in a business that he
freely entered, knowing that the state regulated that business for
the well-being of his customers. Second, he chose to bake
wedding cakes as part of the business. Nobody compelled
Phillips to make that choice, and he could change his business to
make cakes for special events other than weddings. 54 Third, his
characterization of his activity failed to establish that baking a
cake for a wedding constitutes substantial participation in the
event. Phillips did not claim that the wedding cake had, for
example, the sacramental significance of bread and wine in a
Roman Catholic or Eastern Orthodox Mass, such that cakebaking itself was a form of religious worship or practice. Given
his choices prior to the same-sex couple’s cake request, his
peripheral involvement, if any, in the wedding ceremony that he
opposed, and his freedom to express opposition to same-sex
marriage in other settings, the baker’s substantial-burden claim
ignores the factors that minimize that burden.
Moreover, even if one concluded that the law imposed a
substantial burden on Phillips’s religious belief, this burden was
justified by a compelling government interest—avoiding the
indignity imposed on same-sex couples exercising their right to
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marry by denying them a public service available to others.55
Indeed, avoiding harm to others is an important consideration in
the free exercise analysis.56 That consideration should doom any
claim for a religious exception to anti-discrimination laws in the
public square.
III. TRINITY LUTHERAN: THE ASCENDENCY OF THE FREE EXERCISE
CLAUSE OVER THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
A. Accommodation for Religious Institutions
In Trinity Lutheran, a different kind of Free Exercise case
with Establishment Clause implications, the Court had to decide
if the exclusion of a religious organization from participation in
a public program on separationist grounds violated the free
exercise rights of the organization. Missouri’s Department of
Natural Resources offered grants to public and private schools,
non-profit daycare centers, and other non-profit organizations to
help them purchase rubber playground surfaces made from
recycled tires. When the Trinity Lutheran Church applied for
such a grant for its pre-school and daycare learning center, the
Department denied the grant because the Missouri Constitution
has a provision, justified on Establishment Clause grounds,
stating that “no money shall ever be taken from the public
41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 14 Side B
12/10/2019 14:38:26

55. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1746 (describing the interests asserted by
the state of Colorado as avoiding the “denigrat[ion] [of] the dignity of same-sex couples
[and] assert[ion] [of] their inferiority” (quoting Brief for Respondents, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, at *39, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111),
2017 WL 4838415 (quoting J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U.S. 127, 142 (1994) and
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 292 (1964) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring)).
56. See Christopher C. Lund, Religious Exemptions, Third Party Harms, and the
Establishment Clause, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1375, 1476 (2016) (asserting that “[t]he
general principle . . . that burdens on third parties matter . . . is well established”);
Christopher C. Lund, Exploring Free Exercise Doctrine: Equal Liberty and Religious
Exemptions, 77 TENN. L. REV. 351, 371 (2010) (referring to commentators who “see
RFRA as deeply problematic because they believe it gives far too much power to religious
claimants to avoid their legal obligations,” thus giving religious people both “a
presumptive right to disobey the law” and “undue preference over their nonreligious
counterparts”); see also JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 22–23 (3d ed. 1864) (discussing
the harm principle).
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treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect or
denomination of religion.”57
Writing for a seven-member majority, Chief Justice
Roberts noted the agreement of the parties that the
Establishment Clause does not prevent Missouri from including
Trinity Lutheran in the playground program. As he put it,
however, that agreement “[d]oes not . . . answer the question
under the Free Exercise Clause, because we have recognized
that there is ‘play in the joints’ between what the Establishment
Clause permits and the Free Exercise Clause compels.”58

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 15 Side A
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57. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2017–18 (quoting MO. CONST. art. I, § 7). Called
Blaine Amendments after Congressman James Blaine of Maine, who tried unsuccessfully
in 1875 to add language of this type to the First Amendment, such provisions are still found
in the constitutions of thirty-eight states. See, e.g., Mike McShane, Does a Justice
Kavanaugh Mean that Blaine Amendments are History? FORBES (July 10, 2018), https:
//www.forbes.com/sites/mikemcshane/2018/07/10/does-a-justice-kavanaugh-mean-thatblaine-amendments-are-history/#ed0c576e743a; Charlie Melcombe & Stanley CarlsonThies, Supreme Court Upholds Equal Treatment for Faith-Based Organizations to Access
Public Funding, INST’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ALLIANCE (Aug. 10, 2017), http://
www.irfalliance.org/supreme-court-upholds-equal-treatment-for-faith-based-organizationsto-access-public-funding/. In origin, Blaine Amendments were designed to block public
funding for Catholic schools. McShane, supra this note; Melcombe & Carlson-Thies, supra
this note.
58. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2019. The phrase used by the Chief Justice, “play in
the joints,” appears often in cases dealing with the tension between the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. However, it does not always refer to the tension
“between what the Establishment Clause permits and the Free Exercise Clause compels.”
For example, in the case in which the phrase was first used, Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S.
664 (1970), it described the space between what the Establishment Clause prohibits and the
Free Exercise Clause prohibits: “[W]e will not tolerate either governmentally established
religion or governmental interference with religion. Short of those expressly proscribed
governmental acts, there is room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality
which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.”
Id. at 669 (emphasis added). Justice Ginsburg has explained the phrase differently: “This
Court has long recognized that the government may . . . accommodate religious practices
. . . without violating the Establishment Clause.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713
(2005) (citing Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987), and
noting that Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) acknowledges the “‘play in the joints
between’ the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, allowing the government to
accommodate religion beyond free exercise requirements, without offense to the
Establishment Clause”). And there is this version in Locke itself: “There are some state
actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but not required by the Free Exercise
Clause,” Locke, 540 U.S. at 719 (finding a state statute prohibiting state aid to secondary
students pursuing theology constitutional under the First Amendment), a meaning contrary
to the one invoked by the Chief Justice. In short, “play in the joints” is a slippery phrase
with no settled meaning.
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Referring to Smith and its progeny, the Chief Justice wrote
that
in recent years, when this Court has rejected free exercise
challenges, the laws in question have been neutral and
generally applicable without regard to religion. We have
been careful to distinguish such laws from those that single
59
out the religious for disfavored treatment.

Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct at 2020.
Id. at 2024.
Id. at 2019.
Id. at 2022 (citing Sherbert).
Id. at 2019 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 2024.
Id.
Id. at 2028 (Sotomayor & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).

12/10/2019 14:38:26

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
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Missouri had engaged in such disfavored treatment because its
categorical exclusion of religious institutions from a program
otherwise open to public and private schools meant that these
institutions had to “renounce [their] religious character” to
participate.60 Thus, the program “impos[ed] a penalty on the free
exercise of religion.”61
Given that the Missouri law was not a neutral law of
general applicability, the Court evaluated it under the “strictest
scrutiny,”62 noting that it could “be justified only by a state
interest of the highest order.”63 The state defended the law with
its desire to “skate[ ] as far as possible from religious
establishment concerns.”64 But Chief Justice Roberts was not
impressed: “In the face of the clear infringement on free exercise
before us, that interest cannot qualify as compelling.”65 The
Court held that Missouri could not exclude Trinity Lutheran
from the playground-grant program.
In dissent, Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg,
rejected the majority’s premise that Trinity Lutheran was
primarily a free exercise case. Indeed, she chided the majority
for mentioning the Establishment Clause only to note the
parties’ agreement that inclusion of the church in the program
would not violate the Establishment Clause. Constitutional
questions, she said, “are decided by this Court, not the parties’
concessions.”66
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For Justice Sotomayor, the key question in the case was
whether the public funds at issue subsidized religion—“the
touchstone,” as she saw it, “of establishment jurisprudence.”67
Justice Sotomayor answered that question by rejecting the
notion that the playground surfaces of Trinity Lutheran’s
learning center are somehow separate from the religious beliefs
and worship of the church. She did not see how those
playground surfaces could be confined to “secular use any more
than lumber used to frame the church’s walls, glass stained and
used to form its windows, or nails used to build its altar.”68 In
her view, whenever “funds flow directly from the public
treasury to a house of worship,”69 the government is directly
funding religious exercise in violation of the Establishment
Clause. Missouri avoided that violation by excluding churches
from participation in the playground-grant program, and Justice
Sotomayor concluded that it should not be ordered to do
otherwise.70 Indeed, as she saw it, Missouri was prohibited by
the Establishment Clause from doing what Chief Justice Roberts
said the Free Exercise Clause required it to do.
B. How Much Accommodation?

12/10/2019 14:38:26

67. Id. at 2030.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 2028–29.
70. Id. at 2040 (“A State’s decision not to fund houses of worship does not disfavor
religion; rather, it represents a valid choice to remain secular in the face of serious
establishment and free exercise concerns.”).
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The accommodation rationale of Trinity Lutheran, focusing
on a government grant program available to public and private
organizations seeking to improve their playground surfaces,
evoked a hard question about the consequences of the separation
vision of the Establishment Clause. If religiously affiliated
organizations provide important services, such as education,
daycare, nutrition, or home health care, what purpose is served
by denying public support for these programs other than
preserving a strict separation between church and state?
According to Justice Sotomayor, “what purpose” is the wrong
question: the use of public funds to subsidize the ostensibly nonreligious activities of a church or religiously affiliated
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organization inescapably subsidizes its religious activities, no
matter how far removed those non-religious activities are from
the core of religious belief and worship.71 For the adherents of
this strict separation vision, keeping religion out of the public
square, even in the form of government grant programs, is
faithful to the Establishment Clause’s intent to keep government
and religion as separate as possible. In their view, history is
replete with tragic examples of the volatile mix of government
and religion.
However, given the decisions of Justice Breyer and Justice
Kagan to join the opinion of Chief Justice Roberts in Trinity
Lutheran,72 the strict separation vision is now a distinctly

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 16 Side B
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71. Nevertheless, Justice Sotomayor does not invoke the “wall of separation” metaphor
in her Trinity Lutheran dissent. See Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2027–41 (Sotomayor &
Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). The phrase does not appear in the Constitution or the drafters’
contemporaneous documents. It was first used by Thomas Jefferson, in an 1802 letter to the
President of the Danbury Baptist Association. See DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS
JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 48 (2002)
(reproducing Ltr. from Thomas Jefferson, Pres. of the U.S., to Danbury Baptist Assn. (Jan.
1, 1802) [hereinafter “Danbury Letter”]). It was adopted by the Supreme Court in Reynolds
v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (holding that a federal law criminalizing bigamy
does not violate the Free Exercise Clause), and the Court used it later in Everson, 330 U.S.
at 16 (holding that a state law reimbursing parents for transportation costs to private
schools, including religious schools, did not violate the Establishment Clause). More
recently, the authority of that metaphor has been questioned. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting Jefferson’s absence from the country
when the Bill of Rights was under consideration by Congress and describing the Danbury
Letter as a “short note of courtesy”); but see DREISBACH, supra this note, at 26 (noting that
President Jefferson did not dismiss correspondence like the congratulatory note he received
from the Baptist committee in Danbury with “merely a cordial response in kind” and
explaining that he “thought such correspondence furnished an occasion for ‘sowing useful
truth & principles among the people, which might germinate and become rooted among
their political tenets’” (quoting Ltr. from Thomas Jefferson, Pres. of the U.S., to Levi
Lincoln, Att’y Gen. of the U.S. (Jan 1, 1802)). See infra note 170 for a full reproduction of
the passage from the Danbury Letter in which President Jefferson used the “wall of
separation” metaphor for the first time.
72. Justice Breyer has not supported a strict separation view of the Establishment
Clause for some time. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 699 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (explaining that the Establishment Clause, read against the
background of history, cannot “compel the government to purge from the public sphere all
that in any way partakes of the religious” (citation omitted)); see also Howard Friedman,
Justice Breyer Discusses Establishment Clause, RELIGION CLAUSE (Jan. 26, 2006), http://
religionclause.blogspot.com/2006/01/justice-breyer-discusses-establishment.html (reporting
that, in a then-recent dialogue with the Kesher Israel Congregation in the District of
Columbia, “[Justice] Breyer said the Establishment Clause was designed not as an
‘absolute separation’ of church and state, but as a way to ‘minimize social conflict based
on religion’”).
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minority vision on the Court. Moreover, the most relevant
history does not support the strict separation vision articulated
by Justice Sotomayor. As Judge McConnell, a prolific writer on
church/state issues, puts it,
[e]xponents of strict separation are embarrassed by the
many breaches in the wall of separation countenanced by
those who adopted the First Amendment: the appointment
of congressional chaplains, the provision in the Northwest
Ordinance for religious education, the resolutions calling
upon the President to proclaim days of prayer and
thanksgiving, the Indian treaties under which Congress paid
the salaries of priests and clergy.73
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73. Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 933, 939 (1986). The author was a professor of law at the University of
Chicago when he wrote this article and is now a professor at Stanford Law School. In
between those academic appointments, however, he was Judge McConnell of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
74. Id. at 940 (concluding that the government can “pursue its legitimate purposes even
if to do so incidentally assists the various religions”).
75. See 137 S. Ct. at 2030 (Sotomayor & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (pointing out that
“[t]he Church has a religious mission, one that it pursues through the Learning Center”).
76. McConnell, supra note 73, at 940.
77. See Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2029 (Sotomayor & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
78. Id.at 2030.
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And he argues against the “constitutional rule of secularism”74
apparently favored by Justice Sotomayor in her Trinity Lutheran
dissent.75 He believes that, with respect to government financialassistance programs, the government must strike a neutral
position between religion and secularism, as well as between
religions.76
Abstractly, that proposition—supporting with public funds
the socially valuable programs of religious institutions that
mirror the programs of secular institutions—makes sense. The
difficulty arises when the ostensibly secular program of a
religious institution approaches the core of religious worship. As
Justice Sotomayor noted, with Lemon still on the books,
government aid that has the purpose or effect of advancing
religion violates the Establishment Clause,77 which “prohibits
the direct funding of religious activities.”78
These formidable establishment constraints explain why the
majority opinion in Trinity Lutheran was greeted so
enthusiastically in accommodation quarters. It is a prime
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example of the accommodation vision of the Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment: a narrow view of the Establishment
Clause and an expansive view of the Free Exercise Clause.
I am not troubled by the Trinity Lutheran outcome on its
facts. Playgrounds are far from the core of religious worship.
The challenge going forward, however, will be the formulation
of a limiting principle so that the free exercise rationale of
Trinity Lutheran—that government may not impose an
impermissible choice on a religious institution—does not engulf
the Establishment Clause in cases where there is a demand for
the inclusion of religious institutions in public benefits programs
that fall closer to the core of worship.
Those cases are surely coming,79 and the justices know it.
In a controversial footnote in Trinity Lutheran, the likely price
for getting some of the other justices to join his opinion, Chief
Justice Roberts wrote: “This case involves express
discrimination based on religious identity with respect to
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79. See Association of Christian Schools International News Release, ACSI Hails
Landmark Supreme Court 7-2 Ruling in Religious Liberty Case (June 26, 2017), available
at https://www.acsi.org/Documents/Legal%20Legislative/LAC/Trinity%20Lutheran%20S
COTUS%20Ruling_web.pdf (“This victory means that government cannot discriminate
against religious organizations and exclude them from receiving a generally available
public benefit simply because they are religious. It calls into question state Blaine
amendments which have been used to exclude faith-based institutions from public
programs of general application.”). The Supreme Court has now granted certiorari in such a
case. See Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 18-1195, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2777
(June 28, 2019) (granting certiorari). Espinoza addresses whether it violates principles of
free exercise or equal protection for a state court to invalidate a state program as violating
its state constitution because it would benefit religious institutions. The Montana Supreme
Court struck down a state tax-credit program for parents sending their children to private
secular or religious schools. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 435 P.3d 603, 612
(Mont. 2019), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2777 (2019). However, after the
Montana Supreme Court’s decision, the state stopped providing tax credits altogether (to
both secular and religious schools), so the question before the Court is whether invalidating
the program on state constitutional grounds violates the Free Exercise Clause. See Erwin
Chemerinsky, Chemerinsky: Weighty Matters Load the Supreme Court's Next Term,
A.B.A. J. (Oct. 3, 2019, 6:00 AM CDT), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
chemerinsky-an-exceptionally-important-term-at-the-supreme-court. For this reason,
several scholars have suggested that Espinoza may not be a useful vehicle for expanding
Trinity Lutheran’s holding. See id.; Linda Greenhouse, Religious Crusaders at the Supreme
Court's Gates, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/12/opinion
/supreme-court-religion.html (comparing Espinoza to a civil rights era case, Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), which held that a Mississippi city’s decision to close its
public swimming pools altogether, rather than integrate them, did not violate the equalprotection right of its black citizens because both white and black residents were deprived
of a place to swim).
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playground resurfacing. We do not address religious uses of
funding or other forms of discrimination.”80 In a concurring
opinion joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Gorsuch took strong
exception to this footnote, calling it an “ad hoc improvisation”
that
some might mistakenly read . . . to suggest that only
“playground resurfacing” cases, or only those with some
association with children’s safety or health, or perhaps
some other social good we find sufficiently worthy, are
governed by the legal rules recounted in and faithfully
81
applied by the court’s opinion.

Like the drama that will unfold in the public square in a
sequel to Masterpiece Cakeshop, the sequel to Trinity Lutheran
will be divisive and portentous, forcing lower courts, and
eventually the Supreme Court, to weigh the competing Free
Exercise and Establishment Clause concerns generated by these
public benefit cases.
IV. TOWN OF GREECE: TRADITION AND RELIGIOUS MINORITIES
Protecting religious minorities has long been at the
forefront of First Amendment jurisprudence.82 The Court’s 2014
decision in Town of Greece reversed that paradigm, favoring a
majority religious practice over the concerns of religious
minorities.

Marsh v. Chambers,83 decided in 1983, is essential for
understanding Town of Greece. The Marsh Court “found no
First Amendment violation in the Nebraska Legislature’s

12/10/2019 14:38:26

80. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2024 n.3.
81. Id. at 2026 (Gorsuch & Thomas, JJ., concurring in part).
82. Cf. Smith, 494 U.S. at 902 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (pointing out
that “the First Amendment was enacted precisely to protect the rights of those whose
religious practices are not shared by the majority and may be viewed with hostility. The
history of our free exercise doctrine amply demonstrates the harsh impact majoritarian rule
has had on unpopular or emerging religious groups”); Everson, 330 U.S. at 8–10
(explaining that the chief evil addressed by the Establishment Clause is hostility toward
religious dissenters).
83. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 18 Side A

A. Precedent: Marsh v. Chambers

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 18 Side B

12/10/2019 14:38:26

/,3(=5(6(1' '2127'(/(7( 

28



30

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

practice of opening its sessions with a prayer delivered by a
chaplain paid from state funds.”84 Noting that Congress had
practiced legislative prayer since the Constitution’s framing, and
that the majority of state legislatures then used legislative
prayers, the Court concluded that “legislative prayer, while
religious in nature, has long been understood as compatible with
the Establishment Clause.”85
Relying on history and tradition to justify Nebraska’s
legislative prayer, the Court in Marsh chose not to apply the
Establishment Clause test set forth in Lemon.86 This three-part
test—requiring a secular legislative purpose, a principal or
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and an
effect that does not foster an “excessive entanglement with
religion”87—was not casually derived. Instead, it reflects
“consideration of the cumulative criteria developed by the Court
over many years.”88 And it is a stringent test. The statute or
governmental practice at issue has to meet each part of the test
to survive an Establishment Clause challenge. That stringency
prompted the majority in Marsh to rely on history and tradition
as a more congenial way to analyze the constitutionality of
Nebraska’s legislative prayer.89
B. Town of Greece’s Message to Minority Religious Groups

12/10/2019 14:38:26

84. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 575 (describing Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792).
85. Id.
86. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607 (finding statute that provided state funding for non-public,
non-secular schools in violation of the Establishment Clause because it created excessive
entanglement of state and church).
87. Id. at 612–13. The Lemon test has been applied to governmental practices as well as
to statutes. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (applying Lemon test to
uphold city’s practice of displaying a crèche among other Christmas decorations, such as a
Santa Claus house and reindeer).
88. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
89. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786. In dissent, Justice Brennan chided the majority for this
refusal to apply Lemon. See id. at 797 (“The Court makes no pretense of subjecting
Nebraska’s practice of legislative prayer to any of the formal ‘tests’ that have traditionally
structured our inquiry under the Establishment Clause.”).
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Town of Greece pushed the boundaries of Marsh into new
territory. In 1999, Greece assigned a town employee to find
someone to lead the assembled in prayer at the start of each
meeting of the town council. The employee made calls every
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90. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 571–72.
91. Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 2012). The “endorsement test”
was first developed by Justice O’Connor in Lynch. See 465 U.S. at 687 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring). Justice O’Connor explained that there were “two principal ways” in which
government might violate the Establishment Clause: by fostering “excessive entanglement”
between government and religious institutions, or by communicating endorsement or
disapproval of religion. Id. at 687–91. The endorsement test combines the purpose and
effects prongs of the Lemon test into one “endorsement prong.” The Supreme Court
adopted Justice O’Connor’s formulation of the endorsement test in County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) 573, 594–97 (1989) (describing the rationale of the majority
opinion in Lynch as “none too clear” and relying on Justice O’Connor’s concurrence to
apply the endorsement test).
92. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 575.
93. The Town of Greece discussed Lemon in its petition for certiorari, primarily to
characterize it as inapplicable to the case. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Town of
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month to congregations mentioned in a local newspaper or local
directory, both of which listed only Christian churches, until she
found an available clergyperson. As a result, all the prayer
leaders from 1999 to 2007 were Christian. Most of their prayers
invoked “Jesus,” “Christ,” “your Son,” or the “Holy Spirit,” and
they usually closed with phrases like “in the name of Jesus
Christ” or “in the name of your Son.” Often, the prayer leader
would ask the members of the public to stand during the
prayer.90
Not surprisingly, two residents—one a Jew, the other an
atheist—sued the town, asserting that it had violated the
Establishment Clause by preferring Christians over other prayer
leaders and by sponsoring sectarian prayers. They sought an
injunction that would limit the town to “inclusive and
ecumenical” prayers that referred only to a “generic God” and
would not associate the government with any one faith or belief.
The complaining residents lost in the district court but won
before the Second Circuit, which applied a modified version of
the Lemon test and concluded that the town’s prayer practice
impermissibly endorsed Christianity.91 But the Supreme Court
held, in a five-to-four decision written by Justice Kennedy, that
the town’s prayer practice did not violate the Establishment
Clause.92
As in Marsh, the Court in Town of Greece relied on history
and tradition, and ignored Lemon, in finding Greece’s prayer
practice constitutional. Indeed, the parties in their briefing did
not even argue that Lemon governed.93 Still, Justice Kennedy
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felt the need to justify once again the choice made in Marsh to
“carve out an exception” to the court’s Establishment Clause
jurisprudence: “The Court in Marsh found those [Lemon] tests
unnecessary because history supported the conclusion that
legislative invocations are compatible with the Establishment
Clause.”94 Thus, he said, any Establishment Clause test “must
acknowledge a practice that was accepted by the Framers and
has withstood the critical scrutiny of time and political
change,”95 and the relevant inquiry in Town of Greece was
“whether the prayer practice . . . fits within the tradition long
followed in Congress and the state legislatures.” 96
The plaintiffs argued that the town’s prayer practice did not
fit within that tradition because the sectarian language of the
prayers violated the Establishment Clause principle of neutrality,
and the impact of the prayers on some members of the public
violated its prohibition against government coercion of religious
practice. Non-Christians seated in the public meeting space at
the town hall during the prayer would feel that they must
“remain in the room or even feign participation in order to avoid
offending the representatives who sponsor the prayer and will
vote on matters citizens bring before the board.”97
Justice Kennedy rejected the sectarian-prayer argument
with notable heat. These seriatim statements capture his tone:
An insistence on nonsectarian or ecumenical prayer as a
single, fixed standard is not consistent with the tradition of
98
legislative prayer outlined in the Court’s cases.
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Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014) (No. 12-696), 2012 WL 6054799, at *18–*19.
Similarly, the complaining citizens did not primarily rely on Lemon in their brief, arguing
instead that the town’s prayer practice was unconstitutionally “coercive.” See Brief for
Respondents, Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014) (No. 12-696), 2013 WL
5230742, at *17–*18; but see Brief of Erwin Chemerinsky & Alan Brownstein as Amici
Curiae in support of Respondents, Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014) (No.
12-696), 2013 WL 5323367 at *3–*4 (advocating reliance on Lemon).
94. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 575.
95. Id. at 577.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 578.
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The decidedly Christian nature of these prayers must not be
dismissed as the relic of a time when our Nation was less
pluralistic than it is today.99
*****
Government may not mandate a civic religion that stifles
any but the most generic reference to the sacred any more
than it may prescribe a religious orthodoxy.100
*****
The First Amendment is not a majority rule, and
government may not seek to define permissible categories
of religious speech. Once it invites prayer into the public
sphere, government must permit a prayer giver to address
his or her own God or gods as conscience dictates,
unfettered by what an administrator or judge considers to
be nonsectarian.101

Are there any protections for religious minorities in this
embrace of sectarian legislative prayer? Not many:
If the course and practice over time shows that the
invocation denigrates nonbelievers or religious minorities,
threatens damnation, or preach[es] conversion, many
present may consider the prayer to fall short of the desire to
elevate the purpose of the occasion and to unite lawmakers
in their common effort. That circumstance would present a
different case than the one presently before the Court.102
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99. Id. at 579.
100. Id. at 581 (citation omitted).
101. Id. at 582.
102. Id. at 583.
103. Id. at 589.

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 20 Side A

In other words, nonbelievers and religious minorities attending a
council meeting in Greece must be pummeled with threats of
damnation or conversion before they might have a cognizable
grievance about sectarian legislative prayer.
As for coercion, Justice Kennedy noted that some of the
plaintiffs stated at trial that “the prayers gave them offense and
made them feel excluded and disrespected,” but, he pointed out,
“[o]ffense . . . does not equate to coercion.”103 To the contrary,
he said, “[o]ur tradition assumes that adult citizens, firm in their
own beliefs, can tolerate and perhaps appreciate a ceremonial
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104. Id. at 584 (citation omitted).
105. Id. at 590. For a similar perspective, see Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333
U.S. 203, 232–33 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) (expressing skepticism toward
Establishment Clause claim where child could “join religious classes [at his public school]
if he cho[se] . . . or . . . stay out of them” because, although “the Constitution . . . protects
the right to dissent,” it “may be doubted” whether it offers “protect[ion] . . . from the
embarrassment that always attends nonconformity”).
106. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 590.
107. Id. at 616 (Kagan, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting).
108. Id. at 622.
109. Id. at 627 (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95).
110. Id.at 627–28.
111. Id.at 629 (noting that the prayer practice in Greece could not rely on “the
protective ambit of Marsh and the history on which it relied”).
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prayer delivered by a person of a different faith.”104 If they
cannot tolerate such a prayer, and they chose to “exit the
[council] room during a prayer they find distasteful, their
absence will not stand out as disrespectful or even
noteworthy.”105 If they chose to remain in the room, their “quiet
acquiescence will not, in light of our traditions, be interpreted as
an agreement with the words or ideas expressed.”106
Justice Kagan wrote the principal dissent—joined by
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor—in which she agreed
with the decision in Marsh. She did not believe that a town hall
meeting must “become a religion-free zone.”107 She accepted
Justice Kennedy’s description of the issue as “whether the
prayer practice in the town of Greece fits within the tradition
long followed in Congress and the state legislatures.”108 But
unlike Justice Kennedy, she concluded that it did not.
Whereas the prayer practice in Marsh “ha[d] [not] been
exploited to proselytize or advance any one . . . faith or
belief,”109 Justice Kagan noted that the prayers in the Greece
council meetings were “constantly” and “exclusively”
Christian.110 Hence those prayers violated the Establishment
Clause’s neutrality requirement, which prohibits the government
from favoring or aligning itself with any particular creed.111
Addressing the issue of coercion, Justice Kagan envisioned
a Muslim resident of Greece, present at the council meeting only
because she wants to conduct some business. The Muslim
woman (who could be a member of any religious minority)
immediately faces a dilemma described by Justice Kagan:
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She does not wish to be rude to her neighbors, nor does she
wish to aggravate the Board members whom she will soon
be trying to persuade. . . . And she thus stands at a remove,
based solely on religion, from her fellow citizens and her
elected representatives.112

In reality, that Muslim woman has only three options: acquiesce
in the prayer practice by standing with everyone else when the
minister asks them to do so; sit and seem disrespectful; or leave
the council chambers. She does not want to do any of those. At
the heart of her dilemma is government coercion.
C. The Accommodation Vision Gone Awry
As I have written before,113 Town of Greece is a terrible
decision, an example of the accommodation vision gone awry.
Justice Kennedy gave primacy in the public square—here, the
public meeting space in a town hall—to Christian prayer,
without understanding its impact on those who do not share
Christian beliefs. As Professor Neuborne put it, until Town of
Greece,
[t]he Court always asked whether the nonbelieving hearer
was made to feel like an outsider in her own land. After
Town of Greece, nonbelieving hearers subjected to
government-sponsored religious speech may well be told
“Get a thicker skin. After all, this is a Christian country.
You’re here as a tolerated guest.”114

[c]lassically, the Supreme Court invoked the religion
clauses of the First Amendment . . . on behalf of minority
religions. Rulings on behalf of Jehovah’s Witnesses who
wouldn’t salute the flag, Amish parents who wouldn’t send
their children to high school and non-Christians who
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112. Id. at 630, 631.
113. See Kermit V. Lipez, George Washington, Elena Kagan, and the Town of Greece,
New York: The First Amendment and Religious Minorities, 16 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1
(2015).
114. BURT NEUBORNE, MADISON’S MUSIC: ON READING THE FIRST AMENDMENT
143–44 (2015).
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Or, as longtime Supreme Court observer Linda Greenhouse
explained,
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objected to organized prayer in public school form the
backbone of the First Amendment canon.115
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115. Linda Greenhouse, How the Supreme Court Grasps Religion, N.Y. TIMES (May
10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/10/opinion/supreme-court-religion.html.
116. Id.
117. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
118. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 698 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment)
(explaining that one of the “basic purposes” of the Establishment Clause is “to avoid that
divisiveness based upon religion that promotes social conflict, sapping the strength of
government and religion alike”); see also Andrew Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and
the Establishment Clause, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1831, 1834 (2009) (referring to “the
prevention of division along religious lines or of alienation” as “the themes that dominate
contemporary thought about disestablishment”).
119. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 577.
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But in Town of Greece, “the court’s concern . . . flipped,” and
the Court invoked the accommodation vision of the
Establishment Clause on behalf of a majority religion.116
That flip would not have occurred if the Court had applied
the Lemon test to Greece’s prayer practice. Although using a
prayer to solemnize the deliberations of the council meets the
secular-purpose requirement of the Lemon test, Greece’s prayer
practice fails Lemon’s neither-advance-nor-inhibit requirement.
That practice advanced Christianity, exclusively offering
Christian prayers that “sen[t] a message to nonadherents that
they [were] outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that
they [were] insiders, favored members of the political
community.”117 What followed was the religious divisiveness
that the Establishment Clause was designed to prevent.118
That likelihood of a negative outcome for Greece’s prayer
practice if the Lemon test had been applied explains Justice
Kennedy’s decision to eschew Lemon in favor of a test that
would “acknowledge a practice that was accepted by the
Framers and has withstood the critical scrutiny of time and
political change.”119 Lemon does not include an historical
analysis that revisits a country in the late eighteenth century that
was almost exclusively Christian. Instead, its purpose, effect,
and excessive-entanglement prongs focus on the here and now
in a country that is far more religiously diverse than the country
known to the Framers.
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If history and tradition control the contemporary
application of the Establishment Clause, it is easy to understand
Justice Kennedy’s comfort with the exclusively Christian
prayers offered in the town of Greece. However, his comfort is
not shared by the non-Christians who, he said, could “leave the
room.” And that is why the debate over the preservation of the
Lemon test is so consequential. The elimination of Lemon in
favor of a historically rooted practice test would most likely
mean, over time, the greater presence of historically dominant
Christian traditions in the public square, even as our country
becomes more pluralistic.120
V. AMERICAN LEGION AND THE FUTURE ROLE OF RELIGION
IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE
Recently decided by the Court, American Legion addressed
the constitutionality of a thirty-two foot121 concrete Latin
cross122 on public land. With much more disarray among the
Justices, this case renewed the debate about the use of history
and tradition in Establishment Clause jurisprudence and the
preservation of the Lemon test.
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120. See Philip A. Hamburger, Equality and Diversity: The Eighteenth-Century Debate
about Equal Protection and Equal Civil Rights, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 295 (1992) (describing
religious—and overtly Christian—character of early civil-rights discourse).
121. Actually, if one considers the pedestal on which the Cross stands, it is about forty
feet high. See Marty Lederman, Three Things About the “Peace Cross” Case that
Everyone Should—-But Not Quite Everyone Does—Agree Upon, BALKINIZATION (Feb.
25, 2019), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2019/02/three-things-about-peace-cross-case.html.
122. In American Legion, the Court described the “Latin cross” as follows:
The Latin form of the cross “has a longer upright than crossbar. The intersection
of the two is usually such that the upper and the two horizontal arms are all of
about equal length, but the lower arm is conspicuously longer.” G. Ferguson,
Signs & Symbols in Christian Art 294 (1954). See also Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary 1276 (1981) (“latin cross, n.”: “a figure of a cross
having a long upright shaft and a shorter crossbar traversing it above the
middle”).
American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2075 n.6.
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A. Two Precedents: Van Orden v. Perry and McCreary County
v. ACLU of Kentucky

12/10/2019 14:38:26

123. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
124. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
125. Justice Breyer’s concurrence controls because, under Supreme Court practice,
“[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result
enjoys the assent of five justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position
taken by those members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds.’”
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Ga., 428 U.S. 153, 169
n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.)).
126. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 700 (Breyer, J., concurring).
127. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 864.
128. See American Legion, 139 S. Ct. 2067, at 2074–76; see also id. at 2083 (discussing
Van Orden, McCreary, and the secular motivations behind placement of Ten
Commandments monuments around the country in the 1950s).
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In 2005, the Supreme Court decided two so-called passive
symbol cases, Van Orden v. Perry123 and McCreary County v.
ACLU of Kentucky124—both involving displays of the Ten
Commandments—that framed the doctrinal debate in American
Legion. In Van Orden, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a
six-foot granite monolith displaying the Ten Commandments
erected in 1961 between the state capital and the supreme court
building in Austin, Texas. Justice Breyer’s concurrence holding
that monument consistent with the Establishment Clause became
the controlling opinion of the Court in Van Orden.125 In
McCreary, in which the Court declared unconstitutional two
Kentucky-courthouse displays of the Ten Commandments
installed in 1999, Justice Breyer provided the fifth vote for the
majority. However, the analytical approaches he adopted in the
two cases were quite different.
In his concurrence in Van Orden, Justice Breyer applied a
multi-factor analysis that requires the exercise of “legal
judgment” rather than reliance on any particular test.126 In
McCreary, Justice Breyer joined a decision written by Justice
Souter applying the Lemon test and concluding that the displays
failed the first prong of the Lemon test because the displays were
religiously motivated and not neutral. As Justice Souter put it,
“we have not made the purpose test a pushover for any secular
claim.”127 With these models of decisionmaking before the
Court in American Legion,128 the Justices had to choose between
them.
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B. A Plethora of Opinions
In 1918, a committee appointed in Prince Georges County,
Maryland, to design and erect a World War I memorial settled
on the large Latin cross that now stands at the terminus of the
National Defense Highway, which connects Washington, D.C.,
to Annapolis.129 Known as the Bladensburg Cross or Peace
Cross, it sits on a large pedestal that displays the American
Legion’s emblem and the words “Valor,” “Endurance,”
“Courage,” and “Devotion.” The pedestal also features a large
plaque listing the names of the forty-nine local men who died in
the War and explaining that the monument is “dedicated to the
heroes of Prince Georges County, Maryland who lost their lives
in the great war for the liberty of the world.”130
Over the years, memorials honoring the veterans of other
conflicts have been added to the surrounding area, which is now
known as Veterans Memorial Park, but the limited space around
the Peace Cross has left the closest of these other monuments
200 feet away.131 In 1961, the Maryland-National Capital Park
and Planning Commission acquired the Cross and the land on
which it sits to preserve the monument and address traffic safety
concerns.132 Since then, the Commission has spent $117,000 to
maintain and preserve the Cross, and it budgeted an additional
$100,000 for renovations and repairs to the Cross in 2008.133
In 2012, the American Humanist Association134 sued the
Commission, alleging that the Cross’s presence on public land
41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 23 Side A
12/10/2019 14:38:26

129. Id. at 2076–77. The County erected the monument in 1925 with the assistance of
the American Legion. Id. at 2077. The Cross is apparently an impressive sight, particularly
at night. “Approaching from the south on Bladensburg Road (or probably from any other
direction), the illuminated concrete Latin cross, forty-feet tall, dominates the landscape like
a beacon. It appears unexpectedly, seemingly out of nowhere and lacking any evident
context, and as you approach the oddity of it will only deepen, as you come to see that it
stands alone on a grassy, crescent-shaped traffic island at the intersection of two very busy
thoroughfares.” Lederman, supra note 121.
130. American Legion, 139 S. Ct. 2067, at 2077.
131. Id. at 2077–78.
132. Id. at 2078.
133. Id.
134. The Association is an organization whose mission is “to advance an ethical and
life-affirming philosophy free of belief in any gods and other supernatural forces.”
Frequently Asked Questions, AM. HUMANIST ASS’N (2019), https://american humanist.org/
/about/faq/.

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 23 Side B

12/10/2019 14:38:26

/,3(=5(6(1' '2127'(/(7( 

38



30

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

and its maintenance by the Commission violated the
Establishment Clause,135 and seeking “removal or demolition of
the Cross, or removal of the arms from the Cross, to form a nonreligious slab or obelisk.”136 The American Legion intervened to
defend the Cross.137 The district court held the display
constitutional under both the Lemon test and the factors in
Justice Breyer’s Van Orden concurrence.138 Using the same
criteria, the Fourth Circuit reversed.139 The Commission and the
American Legion both petitioned for certiorari, which the Court
granted. The American Legion urged the Court to abandon the
Lemon test.140 The Commission advocated the applicability of
both Lemon and Justice Breyer’s approach in Van Orden.141
By a vote of seven to two, the Court vacated the judgment
of the Fourth Circuit and remanded. The appeal produced seven
opinions. The syllabus of the Court’s decision offers a summary
of the Justices’ votes that almost defies description.142 Justice
Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kavanaugh,
Breyer and Kagan, wrote a five-member majority opinion.
Within that majority opinion is a four-member plurality opinion,
written by Justice Alito and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Kavanaugh and Breyer. It is a plurality opinion because
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135. American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2078. Several area residents were also plaintiffs in
that action. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Md.-Nat’l Capital Park, 147 F. Supp. 3d 373 (D. Md.
2015)), rev’d, 874 F.3d 195 (4th Cir. 2017).
139. Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Maryland-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n, 874
F.3d 195 (4th Cir. 2017).
140. Reply Brief for the American Legion Petitioners, Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Am.
Legion, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct 2067 (2019) (No. 17-1717), 2019 WL 644950, at *6–*9.
141. Brief for Petitioner Maryland-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n, Am.
Humanist Ass’n v. Am. Legion, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct 2067 (2019) (No. 18-18), 2018 WL
6706089, at *20, *54.
142. American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2067 (reporting that “ALITO, J., announced the
judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II-B,
II-C, III, and IV, in which ROBERTS, C.J., and BREYER, KAGAN, and KAVANAUGH,
JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts II-A and II-D, in which ROBERTS, C.J.,
and BREYER and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined. BREYER, J., filed a concurring opinion, in
which KAGAN, J., joined. KAVANAUGH, J., filed a concurring opinion. KAGAN, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in part. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment. GORSUCH, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which
THOMAS, J., joined. GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR,
J., joined.”).
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Justice Kagan declined to join two parts of Justice Alito’s
opinion. Thus, where Justice Kagan joined Justice Alito’s
opinion, Justice Alito wrote for a majority of the Court; where
she did not join, Justice Alito wrote for only a four-member
plurality. Then, Justices Kavanaugh, Kagan, and Breyer each
wrote a concurring opinion. Although Justices Thomas and
Gorsuch also wrote concurrences, they concurred only in the
judgment to vacate, writing separately to distance themselves
from Justice Alito’s majority opinion. Justice Ginsburg
dissented, joined by Justice Sotomayor.
C. Justice Alito’s Opinion

12/10/2019 14:38:26

143. Id. at 2074.
144. Id.; see also id. at 2074–75 (describing secular crosses such as “[t]he familiar
symbol of the Red Cross” and those that appear as the registered trademark for businesses
and secular organizations, like Blue Cross/Blue Shield, the Bayer Group, and Johnson &
Johnson).
145. Id. at 2076.
146. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 701.
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In his introduction to the majority opinion, Justice Alito
invoked a theme that dominated the opinions of the Justices—
the link between the “removal or radical alteration”143 of the
Cross and the public perception of hostility to religion. Part I of
his opinion described the evolution of the cross from a symbol
of Christianity to one with various contemporary meanings,
some of which are “now almost entirely secular.”144 And he also
noted that its use as a World War I symbol reflected “the Cross’s
widespread acceptance as a symbol of sacrifice in the war.”145
This emphasis on the secular significance of the Cross
reflected a factor important to Justice Breyer in Van Orden,
where he wrote that the Ten Commandments, in certain
contexts, can convey “a secular moral message (about proper
standards of social conduct) . . . [a]nd . . . a historical message
(about a historic relation between those standards and the
law).”146 To a considerable extent, Justice Breyer’s Van Orden
concurrence provided a roadmap for Justice Alito’s opinion.
Part II, divided into four subparts (A, B, C, and D), is the
heart of Justice Alito’s opinion; its subparts B and C, which
commanded a majority of the Court, created new law.
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1. New Law: Subparts B and C
In subparts B and C, Justice Alito gave four reasons why
the Lemon test does not apply to “monuments, symbols or
practices that were first established long ago.”147 First,
identifying the original purpose or purposes of an older
monument may be “especially difficult.”148 Second, the
purposes associated with an established monument may multiply
over time.149 Third, the message conveyed by a monument may
also evolve over time.150 Fourth, given this evolution of purpose
and meaning for a monument, any attempt to remove it may “no
longer appear neutral, especially to the local community for
which it has taken on particular meaning.”151 Justice Alito
emphasized this point in stark terms:
A government that roams the land, tearing down
monuments with religious symbolism and scrubbing away
any reference to the divine will strike many as aggressively
hostile to religion. Militantly secular regimes have carried
152
out such projects in the past.

He then created a presumption of constitutionality for old
religious monuments:
These four considerations show that retaining established,
religiously expressive monuments, symbols, and practices
is quite different from erecting or adopting new ones. The
passage of time gives rise to a strong presumption of
constitutionality.153

12/10/2019 14:38:26

147. 139 S. Ct. at 2082.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 2083.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 2084.
152. Id. at 2084–85.
153. Id. at 2085 (emphasis added).
154. Does this mean that American Legion has overruled McCreary? Probably not.
Those Ten Commandments displays were installed in the summer of 1999. McCreary, 545
U.S. at 851. The lawsuit challenging them was filed several months later. In that situation,
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With Justice Kagan joining this part of Justice Alito’s
opinion, there is now new law—a presumption of
constitutionality for established religiously expressive
monuments, symbols, and practices. The Lemon test has become
irrelevant to Establishment Clause challenges to such items.154
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2. The Plurality Opinion: Subparts A and D and Justice Kagan’s
Reservations

12/10/2019 14:38:26

the displays seem more new than established. Still, the line between “new” and
“established” will surely be the subject of future litigation. See supra page 36.
155. 139 S. Ct. at 2081 (footnote omitted).
156. Id. at 2087.
157. Id. at 2094 (Kagan, J., concurring in part).
158. Id.
159. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 579.
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Subpart A contains the plurality opinion’s extensive
criticism of the Lemon test, describing its origins, uneven
application over the years by the Supreme Court, criticism by
some Justices, lower court judges, and scholars, and particular
shortcomings in a case “involv[ing] the use for ceremonial,
celebratory, or commemorative purposes, of words or symbols
with religious associations.”155
Having discredited the use of the Lemon test for analyzing
Establishment Clause challenges to longstanding monuments,
Justice Alito explained in subpart D that the Court should draw
on history for guidance in deciding American Legion, much as it
did in deciding the legislative prayers at issue in Marsh and
Town of Greece.156
In her concurrence, Justice Kagan explained her refusal to
join Justice Alito’s opinion in its entirety. She refused to join his
critique of Lemon in Subpart A because, although a “rigid
application of the Lemon test does not solve every Establishment
Clause problem,” she still found value in “that test’s focus on
purposes and effects . . . in evaluating government action in this
sphere.”157 She declined to join Subpart D because, although she
too “look[s] to history for guidance, . . . [she would] prefer at
least for now to do so case-by-case, rather to sign on to any
broader statements about history’s role in Establishment Clause
analysis.”158
Given Justice Kagan’s dissent in Town of Greece, I
understand why Justice Alito’s reliance in Subpart D on Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion in that case made her wary. Justice
Kennedy had insisted that the town’s Christian legislative
prayers should not be regarded as relics of a “less pluralistic”
society.159 But there is a critical difference between the “new”
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legislative prayer practice in Town of Greece and the “old”
Cross in American Legion. The Cross had stood for eighty-nine
years before it was challenged. Greece inaugurated its prayer
practice in 1999, and the lawsuit challenging it was filed in
2008.160 Hence, the specific prayer practice in Town of Greece
was not nearly so time-honored as the Cross. Understanding this
distinction, Justice Alito apparently felt the need to make the
prayer practice in Town of Greece venerable, not in terms of
years, but in its link to an established tradition of legislative
prayer in Congress and state legislatures:
Of course, the specific practice challenged in Town of
Greece lacked the very direct connection, via the First
Congress, to the thinking of those who were responsible for
framing the First Amendment. But what matters was that
the town’s practice “fit within the tradition long followed in
Congress and the state legislature.”161

In other words, for Justice Alito, tradition casts a long
shadow that must inform the contemporary application of the
Establishment Clause. Does that mean that a new religious
monument in a public park or building, compatible with a
venerable tradition of placing such monuments in such settings,
would survive an Establishment Clause challenge on that basis
alone? Justice Alito’s language could be read that way. Justice
Kagan is reluctant to give history and tradition such
determinative force in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.

American Legion raises two questions about the current
state of Establishment Clause jurisprudence:
x What is the status of the Lemon test?

12/10/2019 14:38:26

160. See Galloway v. Town of Greece, 732 F. Supp. 2d 195, 197, 205, 209 (W.D.N.Y.
2010) (indicating that the town’s prayer practice began in 1999, that one of the plaintiffs
raised her objection to it at a town board meeting in 2007, that plaintiffs met with town
officials on another occasion in 2007 to raise their objection a second time, and that
plaintiffs filed their complaint in 2008).
161. American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2088–89 (citation omitted).
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x Does the “presumption of constitutionality” apply
only to old monuments?
1. Lemon
If Justice Kagan had joined Justice Alito’s general critique
of Lemon in Part II-A of his opinion, there might be an argument
that Lemon is all but dead. But she did not join Part II-A for the
express purpose of preserving Lemon in some circumstances.162
That act of preservation annoyed three of her concurring
colleagues. Justice Kavanaugh devoted most of his concurrence
to demonstrating the uselessness of Lemon.163 Justice Thomas,
who believes that the Establishment Clause should not apply to
the states at all, urged the Court to “take the logical next step
and overrule the Lemon test in all contexts.”164 Justice Gorsuch
praised the plurality’s critique of Lemon and referred to the test
as “now shelved.”165 If nothing else, these frustrated critiques
confirm that Lemon has survived another challenge.
2. The Presumption of Constitutionality

12/10/2019 14:38:26

162. Justice Breyer joined Justice Alito’s opinion in full, including its broad critique of
Lemon, even though he had joined Justice Souter’s majority opinion in McCreary applying
the Lemon test to the Ten Commandments placed in the Kentucky courthouses. See
American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2091 (Breyer, J., concurring). But it is premature to list
Justice Breyer as a Lemon rejectionist. At the end of Part II-A, where Justice Alito first
refers to “a presumption of constitutionality for longstanding monuments, symbols, and
practices,” he focuses on the limitations of Lemon when applied to such cases as capturing
the full extent of Lemon rejection in the plurality opinion. See id. at 2079–81. This part
cannot be fairly read as a rejection of Lemon for all purposes.
163. See American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2092 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
164. Id. at 2097 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
165. Id. at 2101 (Gorsuch & Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment).
166. Id. at 2085 (emphasis added).
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Justice Alito’s majority opinion held that “retaining
established, religiously expressive monuments, symbols and
practices is quite different from erecting or adopting new ones.
The passage of time gives rise to a strong presumption of
constitutionality.”166 Yet, his plurality opinion suggested that
practices or displays that imitate or draw upon tradition,
whatever their age, should enjoy the same presumption. Justice
Kagan wrote separately to distance herself from that conclusion,
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and Justice Breyer concurred with a limiting observation: “Nor
do I understand the Court’s opinion today to adopt a ‘history and
tradition test’ that would permit any newly constructed religious
memorial on public land.”167
Justice Kagan’s caution and Justice Breyer’s observation
elicited a remarkable passage in Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence.
Dismissive of the “presumption of constitutionality” fashioned
by the majority (“How old must a monument, symbol or practice
be to qualify for this new presumption?”),168 he insisted that the
plurality opinion contained a hidden message about the scope of
the presumption of constitutionality that the lower courts should
follow:
Though the plurality does not say so in as many words, the
message for our lower court colleagues seems
unmistakable: Whether a monument, symbol, or practice is
old or new, apply Town of Greece, not Lemon. Indeed,
some of our colleagues recognize this implication and
blanch at its prospect. . . . But if that’s the real message of
the plurality’s opinion, it seems to me exactly right—
because what matters when it comes to assessing a
monument, symbol, or practice isn’t its age but its
compliance with ageless principles. The Constitution’s
meaning is fixed, not some good-for-this-day-only coupon,
and a practice consistent with our nation’s traditions is just
as permissible whether undertaken today or 94 years
169
ago.

12/10/2019 14:38:26

167. Id. at 2019 (Breyer, J., concurring).
168. Id. at 2102 (Gorsuch & Thomas, JJ., concurring).
169. Id.
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In other words, in the application of the new presumption
of constitutionality, the lower courts should ignore the majority
opinion, apply the plurality opinion, and, in so doing, treat old
and new monuments, symbols, or practices the same way. Given
the competing views of Justice Breyer and Justice Gorsuch on
the scope of the presumption, the lower courts will soon see
cases featuring this competition.
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E. Justice Ginsburg’s Dissent
In a now familiar pattern (they were also the two dissenters
in Masterpiece Cakeshop and Trinity Lutheran), Justice
Ginsburg, joined by Justice Sotomayor, filed a dissent that
sounds increasingly like a lonely call for the restoration of the
separation vision of the church/state relationship. She even
invoked President Jefferson’s wall of separation metaphor to
bolster her case.170 And she was unsparing in her criticism of
every element of the majority opinion.
Justice Ginsburg had no patience with attempts to
secularize the Latin cross, describing it as “the foremost symbol
of the Christian faith.”171 And, “[j]ust as a Star of David is not
suitable to honor Christians who died serving their country, a
cross is not suitable to honor those of other faiths who died
defending their nation.”172
She rejected Justice Gorsuch’s suggestion that the “Court’s
new presumption extends to all governmental displays and
practices, regardless of their age.”173 Equally important in a case
in which the survival of the Lemon test was at stake, she also
applied a variant of Lemon—the endorsement test174—to

41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 27 Side A
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170. See id. at 2105 (Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Draft Reply to
the Danbury Baptist Association, in 36 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 254, 255 (B. Oberg
ed. 2009)). President Jefferson’s now famous “wall of separation” metaphor, see supra
note 71, was first used in a letter by Jefferson fourteen years after the adoption of the Bill
of Rights:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and
his God; that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship; that the
legislative powers of the government reach actions only, and not opinions,—I
contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people
which declared that their legislature should “make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” thus building
a wall of separation between church and State.
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (quoting Danbury Letter, supra note
71); see also supra note 71 (discussing the history of the metaphor in Supreme Court
jurisprudence).
171. American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2104.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 2104 n.2.
174. See Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the
Establishment Clause, 90 CAL. L. REV. 673, 704–06 (2002) (explaining the transformation
of the purpose-and-effects prong of the Lemon test into the endorsement test). Elaborated
in cases such as Lynch and County of Allegheny, involving challenges to religious displays,
such as a crèche or menorah on city and county property, the endorsement test asks
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demonstrate the unconstitutionality of the Cross when viewed by
a reasonable observer familiar with “the pertinent facts and
circumstances surrounding the symbol and its placement.”175
In an unusual locution even for a dissent, Justice Ginsburg
presented herself as the reasonable observer: “As I see it,” she
wrote, “when a cross is displayed on public property, the
government may be presumed to endorse its religious
content.”176 With Justice Ginsburg’s first-person perspective
came her identity as a Jew. She explained the significance of
that identity for the reasonable non-Christian observer:
To non-Christians, nearly 30% of the population of the
United States, . . . the State’s choice to display the cross on
public buildings or spaces conveys a message of exclusion.
It tells them they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community.177

She then put that outsider status in theological terms:
Under one widespread reading of Christian scripture, nonChristians are barred from eternal life and, instead, are
condemned to hell . . . . On this reading, the Latin cross
symbolizes both the promise of salvation and the threat of
damnation by dividing the world between the saved and the
damned.178

Exaggeration for effect? Perhaps. But Justice Ginsburg’s
invocation of the damned was no more melodramatic than
Justice Alito’s invocation of “militantly secular regimes”
roaming the land “tearing down monuments with religious
41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 27 Side B
12/10/2019 14:38:26

whether the display has the “effect of ‘endorsing’ religion,” American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at
2105 (quoting County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592); see also note 91, supra (describing
how the endorsement test modified the purpose-and-effects prongs of the Lemon test).
175. Id. at 2106 (quoting Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 721 (2010)). Salazar, like
American Legion, concerned the constitutionality of a cross on public land. The district
court had ordered removal of the cross, but the Supreme Court did not decide the critical
question of whether the display violated the Establishment Clause. Instead, the Court
vacated and remanded the case on the narrow ground that the district court had applied the
wrong standard in granting relief to the petitioner. Salazar, 559 U.S. at 714. Because of its
narrow holding, Salazar had little bearing on American Legion despite the factual
similarities between the cases.
176. American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2106 (Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
177. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
178. Id. at 2107 n.6 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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symbolism.”179 These resorts to hyperbole by ordinarily
restrained justices capture well the high stakes in American
Legion.
F. The Conundrum of the Cross

12/10/2019 14:38:26

179. Id. at 2085.
180. Id. at 2103 (Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting).
181. Justice Alito had said so previously. See Salazar, 559 U.S. at 725 (Alito, J.,
concurring in part, and concurring in the judgment) (“The cross is of course the preeminent
symbol of Christianity. . . .” (citation omitted)).
182. American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2106 (Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting).
183. Id. at 2108 (citation omitted).
184. See, e.g., McCreary, 545 U.S. at 874–81 (describing the Supreme Court’s
longstanding use of the neutrality principle as an “interpretive guide” in Establishment
Clause cases); Brendan Beery, Prophylactic Free Exercise: The First Amendment and
Religion in a Post-Kennedy World, 82 ALB. L. REV. 121, 123 & n.18 (2018) (collecting
cases for the proposition that, “[a]ccording to the Supreme Court, the principle
undergirding the Establishment Clause is neutrality”).
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Justice Ginsburg’s critique of the majority’s secularization
of the Cross is powerful. Invoking a visual image in the opening
line of her dissent (“An immense Latin cross stands on a traffic
island at the center of a busy three-way intersection in
Bladensburg, Maryland”),180 Justice Ginsburg said, in effect,
that any observer driving through that intersection would see the
Cross for what it is: the preeminent symbol of Christianity.181
And since the Cross could not be in that public place without
government permission, she said that the government may be
“presumed to endorse its religious content.”182 Although this
presumption of endorsement could be overcome in some
situations, she saw no possibility of that here: “Every Court of
Appeals to confront the question has held that ‘making a . . .
Latin cross a war memorial does not make the cross secular,’ it
‘makes the war memorial sectarian.’” 183 From that perspective,
the Cross violated a core value of the Establishment Clause—
government neutrality between religions.184
But I think that perspective is too narrow. It allows the
quintessential nature of the Cross as a Christian symbol to so
dominate the neutrality analysis that nothing else about the
Cross matters—its age, origins, physical setting, or acceptance
by the community where it stands. In the way that Justice Breyer
explained in his Van Orden concurrence, and reiterated in his
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American Legion concurrence, these factors do matter. As
Justice Breyer wrote in American Legion, the record of the case
indicates that
the organizers of the Peace Cross acted with the undeniably
secular motive of commemorating local soldiers; no
evidence suggests that they sought to disparage or exclude
any religious group; the secular values inscribed on the
Cross and its place among other memorials strengthen its
message of patriotism and commemoration; and . . . the
Cross has stood on the same land for 94 years, generating
no controversy in the community until this lawsuit was
filed. . . . In light of all these circumstances, the Peace
Cross cannot reasonably be understood as “a government
effort to favor a particular religious sect” or to “promote
religion over nonreligion.”185

12/10/2019 14:38:26

185. American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2091 (Breyer & Kagan, JJ., concurring). In support
of Justice Breyer’s reading of the record on disparagement or exclusion of any religious
group, Professor Marty Lederman of Georgetown Law School notes that “Prince Georges
County was virtually all-Christian during World War I and the record doesn’t reflect any
basis for the government to have had reason to believe that any of the 49 soldiers
commemorated by the Cross weren’t Christian.” Lederman, supra note 121.
186. American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2091 (Breyer & Kagan, JJ., concurring) (quoting
the majority opinion, 125 S. Ct. at 2854).
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Having demonstrated to his satisfaction that the
Bladensburg Cross did not offend the neutrality principle of the
Establishment Clause, Justice Breyer could have ended his
analysis there. But he went on to make a point about hostility to
religion made by Justice Alito in his majority opinion: “as the
Court explains, ordering [the Cross’s] removal or alteration at
this late date would signal ‘a hostility toward religion that has no
place in our Establishment Clause traditions.’” 186 At first glance,
that observation seems odd. Justice Breyer has just explained
that the Bladensburg Cross can be viewed, under all of the
circumstances, as a secular symbol. If that is so, why would the
alteration or removal of a secular symbol reveal an unwarranted
hostility to religion? The answer lies in the conundrum of the
Cross. Inescapably, as Justice Ginsburg demonstrates, the Cross
is a religious symbol. But if that fact overwhelms the other
aspects of the Cross noted by Justice Breyer, the neutrality
principle of the Establishment Clause becomes so exacting that
there is no place for religious symbols in the public sector,
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whatever their provenance. That rigidity would reflect an
unwarranted hostility to religion. As Justice Breyer wrote in his
Van Orden concurrence:
[T]he Establishment Clause does not compel the
government to purge from the public sphere all that in any
way partakes of the religious. . . . Such absolutism is not
only inconsistent with our national traditions, . . . but would
also tend to promote the kind of social conflict the
Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.187

12/10/2019 14:38:26

187. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 699 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
188. American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2085.
189. Id. at 2087–89 (citing Town of Greece’s holding that the town’s relatively new
prayer practice was constitutional because it “[f]it within the tradition long followed in
Congress and the state legislatures”).
190. Id. at 2094 (Kagan, J., concurring in part).
191. Id. at 2091 (Breyer & Kagan, JJ., concurring).
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Agreeing with this analysis, I do not find the outcome of
the American Legion case troubling. But I do find the opinions
of some of the Justices explaining that outcome unsettling for
two reasons. First, there is the ambiguity in Justice Alito’s use of
history in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Such history can
be used in two ways: to defend what is old or to justify what is
new. If I thought that Justice Alito viewed history only as he
suggests he does at times in his opinion—as a defense for the
survival of old religious monuments or practices (“The passage
of time gives rise to a strong presumption of
constitutionality”188)—I would be less troubled by his opinion.
But I have little confidence that Justice Alito holds that limited
view of the importance of history. Indeed, by invoking Town of
Greece to explain his American Legion decision, he suggested
that history can justify new religious monuments and practices
that conform to old traditions.189
As I have noted, Justice Kagan refused to join subpart D of
Justice Alito’s opinion because she did not want “to sign on to
any broader statements about history’s role in Establishment
Clause analysis.”190 And Justice Breyer, reflecting a similar
unease, explained in his concurrence how we should read Justice
Alito’s opinion: “Nor do I understand the Court’s opinion today
to adopt a ‘history and tradition test’ that would permit any
newly constructed religious memorial on public land.”191 There
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are the seeds of future controversy in these statements of
concern about Justice Alito’s use of history.
My second source of concern is Justice Gorsuch’s
concurrence. Unlike most of his colleagues, who seemed to
recognize the difficulty and sensitivity of the Cross case,192
Justice Gorsuch failed to acknowledge the religious diversity of
this country. In a challenge to the well-established theory of
“offended observer” standing193 in Establishment Clause cases,
he belittled—with the pointed use of scare quotes—the
objections of the members of the American Humanist
Association who “regularly” come into “unwelcome direct
contact” with the Cross “while driving in the area.”194 He saw
their objections as symptomatic of a greater problem:
In a large and diverse country, offense can be easily found.
Really, most every governmental action probably offends
somebody. No doubt, too, that offense can be sincere,
sometimes well taken, even wise. But recourse for
disagreement and offense does not lie in federal
litigation.195

Echoing Town of Greece, where Justice Kennedy said that
attendees at council meetings offended by the opening prayers
could leave the room, Justice Gorsuch said that an “offended
viewer” may “avert his eyes.”196 Given that the offended
observers in these passive-symbol cases are almost always
41867-aap_20-1 Sheet No. 29 Side B
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192. Justice Kavanaugh, at the end of his concurrence, offered an unusual consoling
note to the losing plaintiffs:
I have deep respect for the plaintiffs’ sincere objections to seeing the cross on
public land. I have great respect for the Jewish war veterans who in an amicus
brief say that the cross on public land sends a message of exclusion. I recognize
their sense of distress and alienation.
Id. at 2093 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Hence, he said, “[i]t is appropriate to. . . restate
this bedrock constitutional principle. All citizens are equally American, no matter what
religion they are, or if they have no religion at all.” Id. at 2094.
193. Id. at 2098 (Gorsuch & Thomas, JJ., concurring).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 2103. For a defense of observer standing, see Brief of Law Professors as
Amici Curiae in support of Respondents at *4–*5, Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139
S. Ct. 2067 (2019) (No. 17-1717), 2019 WL 582080 (drawing on Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577 (1992) (concerning prayer at public high school graduation and finding that
student had standing because she would hear—regardless of whether she would be forced
to participate in—the prayer at graduation)).
196. American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2103 (Gorsuch & Thomas, JJ., concurring)
(citation omitted).
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religious minorities, Justice Gorsuch’s admonition that they just
look away betrayed insensitivity to their concerns.
Equally disquieting is his zeal to dismantle Lemon, which
led him to assert that “not a single Member of the Court even
tries to defend Lemon against these criticisms,”197 thereby
dismissing the significance of Justice Kagan’s embrace of
Lemon in her concurrence and Justice Ginsburg’s application of
Lemon in her dissent. And I have already noted Justice
Gorsuch’s strange message to lower court judges that they
should ignore any suggestion in the majority opinion that the
new presumption of constitutionality should be limited to old
monuments.198
Finally, Justice Gorsuch did not conceal his contempt for
the passive-symbol litigation that he attributes to Lemon. By
discarding Lemon and offended-observer standing, he wanted to
save “the federal judiciary from the sordid business of having to
pass aesthetic judgment, one by one, on every public display in
this country for its perceived capacity to give offense.”199 With
the Establishment Clause thus diminished (the ardent desire of
the accommodation advocates), there would be more room for a
dominant religion in the public square. That prospect, rather
than the specific outcome of American Legion, makes the case a
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197. Id. at 2101 (internal quotation marks omitted).
198. See text accompanying note 173, supra.
199. Id. at 2103. Would those public displays include a Latin cross on the roof of city
hall during the Christmas season or during the forty days of Lent? This very question arose
between the Justices in a 1989 passive-symbol case involving the constitutionality of a
crèche and a menorah in public buildings in Pittsburgh. In that case, the court found the
placement of the crèche unconstitutional and the placement of the menorah constitutional.
County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 601–02, 20–21. That outcome prompted an exchange
between Justice Kennedy and Justice Blackmun. In his concurring and dissenting opinion,
Justice Kennedy stated that he thought that the Establishment Clause “forbids a city to
permit the permanent erection of a large Latin cross on the roof of city hall.” Id. at 661
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Citing Justice
Kennedy’s use of the word “permanent,” Justice Blackmun asked in his majority opinion,
“for Justice Kennedy, would it be enough of a preference for Christianity if that city each
year displayed a crèche for 40 days during the Christmas season and a cross for 40 days
during Lent (and never the symbols of other religions)?” Id. at 607 (Blackmun, J.).
Although Justice Kennedy did not answer the question in that case, it is now clear how
Justice Gorsuch would answer. Given his views on offended-observer standing, he would
say that anyone offended by the cross should not be allowed to seek relief in court, thereby
sparing the courts from that “sordid business” of passing aesthetic judgment on it.
American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2103. Instead, they should address their concerns to the city
council. Id.
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troubling harbinger if Justice Gorsuch wins more allies for his
views.200
VI. CONCLUSION
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200. Implicitly, seven of the justices rejected Justice Gorsuch's views on offendedobserver standing by reaching the merits of American Legion. At least on that issue, his
only ally may be Justice Thomas. He has much more support for his zeal to dismantle
Lemon, with implications far beyond these passive symbol cases.
201. Masterpiece Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 51, 2017 WL 3913762, at *9. It is
important to note, however, that there is no single view in Christianity about the
rightfulness of same-sex marriage. In fact, a majority of Christians in the United States said
in 2015 that same-sex relationships “should be accepted by society,” with fifty-four percent
of Protestants and seventy percent of Catholics sharing that view. Caryle Murphy, Most
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I began this essay by observing that there are two
competing visions on the Supreme Court about the proper
relationship between the government and religion under our
Constitution—accommodation and separation. Although that
remains true after American Legion, the separation vision is
steadily losing ground, with Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor
its only remaining adherents. Justice Breyer and Justice Kagan
reflected elements of both visions in their American Legion
opinions, with a decided accommodation tilt. Even without
them, the accommodation advocates now have five sympathetic
justices in their camp with the arrival of Justice Kavanaugh.
Hence, these advocates will continue to pursue their two
most cherished goals: overturning Smith and Lemon. In their
view, overruling the former will dramatically increase the
presence of religion in the public square under the Free Exercise
Clause, and overruling the latter will do so under the
Establishment Clause. The outcomes in Town of Greece and
American Legion provide a preview of the beneficiaries of that
shift in Establishment Clause jurisprudence—Christian
denominations with their grounding in the early history of this
country. Arguably, using the challenge to public accommodation
laws in Masterpiece Cakeshop as a guide, overturning Smith
might have the same effect in free exercise jurisprudence. The
Masterpiece baker grounded his objection to same-sex marriage
in his understanding of Christian teaching that “marriage is a
sacred union between one man and one woman, and that it
represents the relationship of Jesus Christ and His Church.”201
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Of course, opponents of same-sex marriage might base their
religious objections on a faith other than Christianity. In that
sense overturning Smith might promote religious diversity in a
way that overturning Lemon would not. When Smith was first
decided, it was criticized as a threat to religious diversity and the
protection of minority religion.202 That criticism continues.203
Indeed, there is a consensus in church/state jurisprudence that
the Religion Clauses “aim to protect minorities in religious
matters” against the majority generally and the politically
accountable branches specifically.204 Smith runs counter to that
purpose.
Although I have no settled view on the wisdom of
overturning Smith, I do think that there are reasons for caution.
Smith operates in the realm of neutral laws of general
applicability. As both Masterpiece and Trinity Lutheran show,
the requirement of neutrality is not meaningless. Alas, as Justice
Scalia said in Smith,
Values that are protected against government interference
through enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby
banished from the political process. Just as a society that
believes in the negative protection accorded to the press by
the First Amendment is likely to enact laws that
affirmatively foster the dissemination of the printed word,
so also a society that believes in the negative protection
accorded to religious belief can be expected to be solicitous
205
of that value in its legislation as well.
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U.S. Christian Groups Grow More Accepting of Homosexuality, PEW RESEARCH CTR.
(Dec. 18, 2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/12/18/most-u-s-christiangroups-grow-more-accepting-of-homosexuality/. By contrast, only thirty-six percent of
evangelical Protestants believe that same-sex relationships “should be accepted.” Id.
202. See note 15, supra.
203. See, e.g., Stephanie H. Barclay & Mark L. Rienzi, Constitutional Anomalies or AsApplied Challenges? A Defense of Religious Exemptions, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1595 (2018).
204. Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions and the Religion Clauses, 82 WASH. U. L.Q.
919, 924 (2004).
205. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
206. See supra pp. 11–12.
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Both the federal and state RFRAs confirm Justice Scalia’s
observation.206 With their incorporation of the Sherbert
balancing tests, they reflect solicitude for minority religious
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beliefs and practices.207 And the Court created a firestorm when
it essentially overturned the Sherbert balancing test in Smith.208
There is a cautionary tale in that firestorm. Stability in the law is
an important value.
As for Lemon, it does not deserve the derision heaped upon
it. Writing for the Court in Lemon, Chief Justice Burger said that
the Court “gleaned” its three-part test by “consideration of the
cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years.”209
That distilled wisdom should not be jettisoned just because
Lemon incorporates separation values that frustrate
accommodation advocates. To be sure, as the critics of Lemon
demonstrate in American Legion, the Court has ignored Lemon
in many subsequent Establishment Clause cases.210 That
divergence bespeaks the futility of attempting to use any single
test for resolving every Establishment Clause case. Yet, as
Justice Kagan intimated in American Legion, Lemon may
remain useful for analyzing cases in which the accommodation
costs are high—for example, if there is a demand for a new
religious monument, arguably grounded in tradition, in a public
building or park.211
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207. Cf. Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA
L. REV. 1465, 1470 (1999) (presenting the view that the constitutional rule of Smith
combined with federal and state RFRAs offers the ideal balance between protecting “the
political process” and protecting minority religious practitioners against “the mechanical
application of rules that were designed without any thought about religious objectors”).
208. See supra pp. 11–12.
209. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612; see also text accompanying notes 86–89, supra.
210. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002) (upholding
school voucher program without using Lemon test); Good News Club v. Milford Cent.
Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 119 (2001) (ignoring Lemon test in holding that allowing religious
groups that offer after-school activities to use school facilities does not violate
Establishment Clause).
211. I recognize that preserving the Lemon test for occasional use evokes Justice
Scalia’s famous metaphor that the Lemon test “stalks [the Supreme Court’s] Establishment
Clause jurisprudence” like “some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up
in its grave” whenever its use supports the desired outcome. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr.
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). For
Justice Scalia, such occasional use was anathema because he subscribed to a narrow view
of the Establishment Clause that bars only coercion “by force of law and threat of penalty.”
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
However, I disagree with that narrow view of the Establishment Clause, and so I am
untroubled by the prospect of invoking Lemon under appropriate circumstances. See infra
at pp. 55–56.
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Of course, if Smith and Lemon are to go, the Supreme
Court will have to do it in future cases. Meanwhile, with the free
exercise issues raised by Masterpiece still unresolved, the free
exercise implications of Trinity Lutheran unexplored, and the
scope of the presumption of constitutionality for religious
monuments or practices uncertain, there will be plenty of work
for the lower courts in these difficult church/state cases. As
these cases play out, I hope accommodationist critics of
outcomes that disappoint them will stop suggesting that any
reliance by judges on separationist values in their opinions
reflects “an implicit disdain for the religious world view.”212
In her dissent in Trinity Lutheran, Justice Sotomayor
anticipated and responded to this unfair conflation of the
separation vision with hostility to religion generally:
A State’s decision not to fund houses of worship does not
disfavor religion; rather, it represents a valid choice to
remain secular in the face of serious establishment and free
exercise concerns. That does not make the State “atheistic
or antireligious.”213
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212. Mark Fischer, The Sacred and the Secular: An Examination of the “Wall of
Separation” and Its Impact on the Religious World View, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 325, 340
(1992); see also RICHARD J. NEUHAUS, AMERICAN BABYLON: NOTES OF A CHRISTIAN
EXILE 204 (2009) (describing those who hold to the separation vision as “methodological
atheists” who believe that “[o]nly those arguments are to be admitted to public deliberation
that proceed as if God did not exist”). For more extreme variations on this theme, see Ann
Coulter’s Godless: The Church of Liberalism (2006), John Gibson’s The War on Christmas
(2005), and David Limbaugh’s Persecution: How Liberals are Waging War Against
Christianity (2003).
213. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2040 (Sotomayor & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
214. Id. at 2041.
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Indeed, as Justice Sotomayor saw it, her strict separation view
strengthens religion, for “[h]istory shows that the Religion
Clauses separate the public treasury from religious coffers as
one measure to secure the kind of freedom of conscience that
benefits both religion and government.”214 There can be good
faith debate about this proposition. There is no justification,
however, for equating its wariness about the role of religion in
the public square with religious animus.
Thus, an anti-discrimination law that is neutral about
religion could appropriately be applied in a future case like
Masterpiece Cakeshop to reject the free exercise claim of a
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215. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 616 (Kagan, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ.,
dissenting).
216. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 703.
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reluctant baker. The demand for a religious exception from
neutral laws is based upon a perceived conflict between their
requirements and the right to worship freely. Judges would have
to weigh the baker’s interest in receiving an exemption to
exercise a particular religious view against competing
considerations—the right to express that religious view in the
home, houses of worship, and many public places; the free
choice made by those who pursue businesses regulated by antidiscrimination laws; and the vital protection afforded members
of minority groups of all kinds by anti-discrimination laws.
Treating the free exercise of religion in the conduct of business
as one competing value in that assessment, and deeming it to be
less weighty than others in a particular case, would reflect due
consideration of all worthy values, not hostility to religion.
And if Justice Kagan’s dissent in Town of Greece had been
the majority opinion, that decision would not have reflected
hostility to religion. As she pointed out, town council meetings
need not be “religion-free zones.”215 They need only be zones in
which the religious diversity of the wider community is honored,
not ignored. There is no disparagement of religion in that
insistence.
Or, in a sequel to Trinity Lutheran, if government excludes
religious organizations from a government grant program, and
the subject matter of that grant program is so close to the core of
religious worship that the “play in the joints” between the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause favors the
Establishment Clause, that difficult judgment would not betray
hostility to religion. Rather, it would reflect a weighing of the
competing values cited by Justice Breyer in his Van Orden
concurrence. As he put it, the concerns of the Lemon test with
government’s “excessive interference with, or promotion of,
religion” and “excessive government entanglement with
religion” still have force.216 That recognition does not belittle
religion.
As I have already noted, I admire Justice Breyer’s Van
Orden methodology, so prevalent in his American Legion
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concurrence.217 Although he had “hostility to religion” very
much on his mind in Van Orden, he was not worried that Court
observers would unfairly criticize the Justices. Rather, he
worried that the Court, in making its decision about the
constitutionality of the Ten Commandments display on the
Texas capital grounds, might not sufficiently appreciate that
hostility to religion was a concern at the core of the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment.218
After looking at the totality of the circumstances in that
case—the physical structure of the granite monument, its
donation by a “private civic (and primarily secular)
organization,” its forty-year presence on the capital grounds
without legal objection, and its physical setting, Justice Breyer
concluded that the circumstances suggested that the state
intended to convey a moral and secular message instead of a
religious message with its Ten Commandments monument, and
that the display would be so perceived by the public.219 To order
the removal of the Ten Commandments because of the religious
nature of the tablets’ text would, in those circumstances,

This attention to consequences in Van Orden is not
surprising, as Justice Breyer has long emphasized that judges
should consider such consequences in applying statutes or the
Constitution. “Since law is connected to life,” he has written,
“judges, in applying a text in light of its purpose, should look to
consequences, including ‘contemporary conditions, social,
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217. See text accompanying notes 185–87, supra.
218. See id. at 699 (expressing concern that “untutored devotion to the concept of
neutrality can lead to invocation or approval of results which partake not simply of that
noninterference and noninvolvement with the religious which the Constitution commands,
but of a brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular and a passive, or even active,
hostility to the religious” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
219. Id. at 701–04.
220. Id. at 704 (citation omitted).
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lead the law to exhibit a hostility toward religion that has
no place in our Establishment Clause traditions. Such a
holding might well encourage disputes concerning the
removal of longstanding depictions of the Ten
Commandments from public buildings across the Nation.
And it could thereby create the very kind of religiously
based divisiveness that the Establishment Clause seeks to
220
avoid.
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industrial, and political, of the community to be affected.’”221
This attention to consequences, in turn, provides “an important
yardstick to measure a given interpretation’s faithfulness to . . .
democratic purposes” and enables a judge to assess whether it is
“consistent with the people’s will.”222
Although this language may seem too mystical to help
judges decide actual cases, that is not so. Historians are adept at
discerning purposes in historical events, such as the writing and
ratification of the Bill of Rights, and judges use that history in
their opinions. Drawing on these sources in Van Orden, Justice
Breyer recounted the basic purposes of the Religion Clauses:
x to “assure the fullest possible scope of religious
liberty and tolerance for all”;223
x to avoid “divisiveness based upon religion that
promotes social conflict, sapping the strength of
government and religion alike”;224 and
x to maintain the “separation of church and state” that
has long been critical to the “peaceful dominion that
religion exercises in [this] country,” where the
“spirit of religion” and the “spirit of freedom” are
productively “united,” “reign[ing] together” but in
separate spheres “on the same soil.”225
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221. STEPHEN J. BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 18 (2005).
222. Id. at 115.
223. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 698 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Abington, 374 U.S.
at 306 (Goldberg & Harlan, JJ., concurring)).
224. Id.
225. Id. (quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 282–83 (1835)
(H. Mansfield & D. Winthrop trans. & eds. 2000)). Justice Breyer’s concerns about
allaying divisiveness have a solid grounding in history.
226. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 700.
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These purposes, in turn, reveal that “the relation between
government and religion is one of separation, but not of mutual
hostility and suspicion.”226 There must be room for religion in
the public square without the excessive entanglement that
compromises both government and religion.
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227. Id.
228. I am not alone in my admiration of Justice Breyer’s Van Orden concurrence. See
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Salute to Justice Breyer’s Concurring Opinion in Van Orden v.
Perry, 128 HARV. L. REV. 429, 433 (2014) (“[Justice Breyer’s] method seems to me to
have been exemplary. . . . [H]e interpreted the Establishment Clause as requiring fine line
drawing to avoid acutely divisive rulings that would achieve too little good under at least
some circumstances. My hat comes off to Justice Breyer’s Van Orden opinion for candidly
shouldering the responsibility that goes with a conception of the judicial role in which good
judging requires good judgment.”)
229. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 698 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Abington, 374 U.S.
at 306 (Goldberg & Harlan, JJ., concurring)).
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Do these recognitions of purpose offer judges a selfexecuting guide to deciding church/state cases? Of course not.
They simply inform, as Justice Breyer put it, the need for the
“exercise of legal judgment” in those inescapable “borderline
cases.”227 And, importantly, they do what all principles or
purposes or standards do for judges—they provide a framework
for assessing the significance of the facts in the dispute before
them. In Van Orden, Justice Breyer looked at those facts (“the
totality of the circumstances”), and, in light of his understanding
of the purposes of the Establishment Clause, drawn from history
and Supreme Court precedent, concluded that the Ten
Commandments display on the Texas capital grounds should
remain in place.228
I realize that this model of decisionmaking, grounded in
constitutional purposes and values, applied to the vast variety of
facts in church/state cases, creates an unwelcome
unpredictability for those who seek to eliminate the messiness of
church/state jurisprudence with bright line rules, a unifying
theory of the Religion Clauses, or a single-factor analysis—an
impossible enterprise. Church/state jurisprudence is inescapably
messy because, as the Justices themselves have recognized,
there is “no simple and clear measure which by precise
application can readily and invariably demark the permissible
from the impermissible.”229 In short, the church/state puzzle will
always remain a puzzle. But judges still have to decide cases. To
that end, Justice Breyer’s purpose-driven, multi-factor approach
provides the best hope for sensible outcomes faithful to the
intent of the Religion Clauses.

